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ABSTRACT
As the level of sophistication in power system technologies increases, the 
amount of system state parameters being recorded also increases. This data not only 
provides an opportunity for monitoring and diagnostics of a power system, but it also 
creates an environment wherein security can be maintained. Being able to extract 
relevant information from this pool of data is one of the key challenges still yet to 
be obtained in the smart grid. The potential exists for the creation of innovative 
power grid cybersecurity applications, which harness the information gained from 
advanced analytics. Such analytics can be based on the extraction of key features 
from statistical measures of reported and contingency power system state parameters. 
These applications, once perfected, will be able to alert upon potential cyber intrusions 
providing a framework for the creation of power system intrusion detection schemes 
derived from the cyber-physical perspective. With the power grid having a growing 
cyber dependency, these systems are becoming increasingly the target of attacks. The 
current power grid is undergoing a state of transition where new monitoring and 
control devices are being constantly added. These newly connected devices, by means 
of the cyber infrastructure, are capable of executing remote control decisions along 
with reporting sensor data back to a centralized location.
This dissertation is an examination of advanced data mining and data analytic 
techniques for the development of a framework for detecting malicious cyber activity in
the power grid based solely on reported power system state parameters. Through this 
examination, results indicate the successful development of a cyber-event detection 
framework capable of detecting and localizing 92% of the simulated cyber-events. In 
focusing on specific types of intrusions, this work describes the utilization of machine 
learning techniques to examine key features of multiple power systems for the detection 
of said intrusions. System analysis is preformed using the Newton-Raphson method 
to solve the nonlinear power system partial differential power flow equations for a 
5-Bus and 14-Bus power system. This examination offers the theory and simulated 
implementation examples behind a context specific detection approach for securing 
the current and next generation’s critical infrastructure power grid.
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Industrial control systems (ICS) are present across many industries ranging 
from transportation to utilities [3]. An ICS is comprised of multiple controllers, each 
functioning as logic engines using conditional processing. One of the most prevalent 
ICSs is the critical infrastructure power grid. This meshed network of geographically 
distributed control systems (DCS) has recently seen an influx of solid-state devices with 
Internet/intranet networking capabilities. Benefits of this influx include the command 
and control ability granted to the governing ICS. This governing ICS contains the 
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. However, with this influx 
of smart network capable devices, the potential for various cyber threats arises [4] and 
therefore sophisticated cyber detection and localization methods must be developed 
and analyzed.
A basic model, derived from similar ones presented in [5, 6], of a power system 
application with state feedback is presented in Figure 1.1. The feedback model shown 
is governed by the energy management system (EMS) which, during an event, will 
instruct the SCADA system to send control commands to the power system application
[7]. An event can consist of a fault, i.e. a downed power line, or a disturbance as 
modest as a customer turning on a lamp. Events change the operating conditions of
1
the application and if drastic enough will cause the EMS to take immediate action 
to protect the system from catastrophic failure. In instances where the event does 
not cause immediate harm to the power system, the EMS will remain idle or change 
control parameters to provide power to customers more economically. The purpose of 
this feedback interface is for the constant monitoring and control of the power system 













Figure 1.1: Basic Power System Application Feedback Model
The remote execution and control vulnerabilities inherent to ICS arises from 
the utilization of information technology (IT) systems. Such technology includes the 
communication and device infrastructure that is used in the current grid and the 
proposed schemes that are to be used in the future smart grid. Thus, the vulnerabilities 
found in the supporting IT infrastructure can be exploited to compromise an ICS
[8]. Because an ICS requires 100% availability and equal reliability, implementing 
traditional IT security may provide an additional dimension of attack vectors that an 
attacker can use to breach an ICS. Using IT based security alone enables an attacker, 
through the use of zero-day attacks or non-patched systems attacks, the ability to
3
effectively infiltrate the control system’s local area network (LAN), granting control 
from either inside or outside the network. A system that can recognize these intrusions 
and isolate them based on control level data and not just IT level data will effectively 
prevent most attacks from occurring or at the very least minimize damage caused by 
the intrusion.
To solve this problem, this work examines control system security, specifically 
power grid security, using a context specific approach. The work demonstrated here 
takes an inter-disciplinary approach using techniques from the machine learning 
community and applies them to the power flow dynamics of multiple power systems 
in an effort to detect and localize cyber intrusions. Based on the state variables of 
the power system, features are identified using techniques first introduced in the data 
mining community. These features then serve in the development of models used in 
the detection and localization of the system breaches.
1.1 M otivation
Enhancing the security posture of the critical infrastructure power grid is one of 
the biggest challenges in cyberspace. One of the goals of the Obama administration’s A 
Policy Framework for the 21st Century Grid is a power infrastructure with improved 
grid security and resilience [9]. This resilience describes a need for a self-healing 
network that can prevent, detect, mitigate, and effectively avoid most cyber threats 
found in a control system environment. The integration of today’s petabytes [10] and 
tomorrow’s exobytes of state parameters and the ability to process it diligently using
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revolutionary cyber incident detection models will make this goal among others a 
reality.
Originally, the control system local area network (LAN) was not connected to 
any Internet/Intranet connected devices. This created the so-called air-gap, physically 
securing the devices from other Internet connected devices. However, for an increase in 
efficiency and remote monitoring capabilities, the control system had to be integrated 
into corporate LANs. The recommended network architecture for a control system LAN 
is provided in [11]. This recommended controls system protection scheme combines 
the practices of IT security to the control system with the goal of an end-all secure 
environment. Furthermore, in a recent report [12], a total of 7,200 control devices 
have been found to be directly connected to the World Wide Web. This project known 
as SHINE was stared in Spring of 2012 and sought to raise awareness for controls 
system security with the initial finding reaching 500,000 Internet connected devices. 
In a recent report [13], it is stated that the energy sector is the fifth-most-targeted 
sector worldwide and is hit with nine highly sophisticated attacks per day. These and 
other statistics, shown in Table 1.1, reveal the immediate action needed to secure the 
control infrastructure that governs power systems.
Table 1.1: Cybersecurity Statistics Concerning Power Systems
Description Source Cite
Public Utility Compromised ICS-CERT [14]
Observed Energy Sector Attacks Cisco [15]
500,000 ICS Devices Openly Connected to WWW ICS-CERT [12]
9 sophisticated attacks per day Symantec [13]
Reported ICS attacks up 52% in 2012 Dept. Homeland Security [16]
Cyber attack becoming primary threat against U.S. FBI [17]
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1.1.1 Vulnerabilities
A vulnerability in terms of industrial control system is any weakness that can 
be exploited in such a way that will compromise the intended operation of the control 
system. In an article published by the Idaho National Laboratory [18], the common 
vulnerabilities of industrial control systems are outlined. Vulnerabilities include lack 
of input validation, weak communication protocols and authentication, and failure to 
the patch system’s software.
Threats against the critical infrastructure power grid are inevitable and continue 
to happen every day. Some threats are the result of accidental circumstances while 
others are the direct result of aggressors. In the context of cyber, these aggressors 
include hackers, who may attack for various reasons including: intellectual challenge, 
curiosity, monetary gain, power, vengeance, or terrorism. In addition, breaches into 
critical infrastructures may be the result of a nation-state sponsored effort.
1.1.2 D ata the Grid Offers
The source of the petabytes of data is a result of two new intelligent electronic 
devices (IEDs): the phasor measurement unit (PMU) and the smart meter. The 
smart meter is the base element of the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI). This 
is in part a result of the establishment of the Smart Grid Investment Grant (SGIG) 
program by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 [19], Section 1306, 
and amended under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 [20]. In 
July of 2012, the Department of Energy (DOE) published a progress report of the 
SGIG program stating that PMUs offer the essential wide-area visibility needed in
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the power grid due to its sampling rate of 30 to 120 times per second. The report 
then goes on to state that there are currently over 950 networked PMUs installed in 
North America funded by the SGIG program. The SGIG AMI projects support the 
installation of smart meters capable of transm itting data at 15-, 30-, or 60-minute 
intervals for customer billing information, interval load data, system voltage levels, 
and power quality. There are currently a total of 65 SGIG AMI projects, with an end 
goal of installing a total of 15.5 million smart meters [21]. As of April 30th 2014, the 
total number of AMI meter installations reported to the SmartGrid Integrated Project 
Reporting Information System  (SIPRIS) [22] was found to be 16.2 million, well past 
the end goal [23].
An industry projection suggests that by 2015, there will be a total of 65 
million smart meters installed nationwide. The RF meshed AMI network is operated 
predominately on the unlicensed Industrial, Scientific, and Medical (ISM) band between 
902-928 MHz and is defined in Part 15 of the FCC regulations. A proprietary protocol 
that is optimized for AMI meshed network communication is described in [24], When 
in initiation mode, each packet is 32 bytes in length with a header of 15 bytes that is 
capable of containing the packet’s route. Metering nodes are capable of caching the 
previously established packet routes for future communication. The security of packet 
transmission can be based on key pairs [25]. However, this protocol and others have 
been found to have vulnerabilities as demonstrated by Brinkhaus et al. [26].
At the distribution level, the electrical loads are determined by the power 
consumption of the customers. This example of interdependence, among others, allows 
for a unique opportunity for the development of an analytical framework that in
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the event of a cyber incident will detect a certain number of inconsistencies in the 
reported power system state variables. Table 1.2 shows an example of power level 
data based on the estimated average smart grid enabled utility readings per day. 
The data is categorized into three classes: 1) raw data 2) pre-processed data and 
3) database or historical data. The raw data  is aggregated by the SCADA system 
without any preprocessing done by the smart device controllers and is stored in 
databases in a Historian server. Database and historical data can be analyzed for its 
trending information and will contain information that can be used to detect high-level 
periodic malware similar to the Stuxnet worm. Stuxnet, a malicious program that 
autonomously targeted the control systems of an Iranian nuclear facility is believed 
to be installed on more than 60,000 computers [27]. The code of this revolutionary 
cyber-weapon is freely available online.
Table 1.2: Example of power data  based on estimated average smart grid enabled 
utility readings per day.
D a ta F rom C la ss D a t a  A m t A n a ly s is
Circuit Breaker Position Substation 2 lOkb Real T im e
Over Current Alert Substation and Line IED 2 lOkb R eal T im e
Protective Relay Status Substation 2 lOkb Real Tim e
D evice Voltage M eters Substation and Line IED 1 lOOkb Real T im e
D evice Current M eters Substation and Line IED 1 lOOkb Real T im e
Feeder Switch Substation 2 lOkb Real T im e
Telemertered Readings Substation 2 lOkb Real T im e
Transformer Meters Substation 1 lOOkb Real T im e
Line Voltage Meters Power Line IEDs 1 lOOkb Real Tim e
Line Current Meters Power Line IEDs 1 lOOkb Real T im e
Power Flow EMS 2 100Mb Real T im e
Fault Location Reporting EMS 2 lOOkb Offline
Historian EMS 3 10Tb Offline
Smart M eter Readings AMI 2 1Tb Real Tim e
Appliance Reporting HAN Zigbee D evices 2 100Mb Real Tim e
Micro Generation Photovoltaic, W ind, etc 2 lOOkb Real Tim e
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1.1.3 W hy a Context Specific Approach
The end goal of any ICS attack is to obtain control over the critical application. 
Therefore, the end objective of the attack is to change some parameter of the system 
being controlled. The approach developed by this dissertation takes advantage of 
this fact and uses the system parameters to detect the presence of a cyber intrusion. 
More classical detection schemes may not be able to detect an intrusion due to the 
level of sophistication of the intrusion. These classical detection schemes are based on 
detecting intrusions locally by monitoring firewall logs, network traffic, and system 
logs among others. Though a valuable source of information, these sources do not 
provide a full picture of the system that is trying to be secured.
For example, in Brinkhaus et al. [26] the goal of the attack demonstrated was 
to change the power consumed by the customer so they would not have to pay as 
much on their power bill. To perform this attack successfully, the aggressor has to 
spoof the information being reported from a meter to the collector. An IT intrusion 
detection system (IDS) may or may not be able to detect this type of intrusion. The 
ability to detect depends on the level of sophistication of the attack. For instance, if 
the spoofed packet has all the information correctly spoofed, the IT IDS would not be 
able to recognize the intrusion. This is because IT IDSs are signature based detection 
systems and any deviation from those signatures will trigger an alarm. Whereas 
in a distributed network such as the critical infrastructure power grid system, the 
parameters reported in one location are based off of what is happening at a different 
part of the system. Examples of this dependency includes the fact that the power 
being consumed by a customer depends on the power being supplied to the customer.
1.2 Statem ent of H ypothesis
Given the number of reporting intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) being added 
to the critical infrastructure power grid, a framework can be formulated that utilizes 
the historical system state variables for the detection and localization of malicious cyber 
activity based on prediction models that fully express key system features. Formulation 
of this framework is based on a detection scheme founded in knowledge discovery 
techniques including: discriminant analysis and principal component analysis.
1.3 Contributions
As this work is an inter-disciplinary approach to solving the problem of securing 
the critical infrastructure power grid, it provides not only to the area of power systems, 
but also to the areas of cybersecurity, data knowledge discovery, and other related 
fields. This work successfully demonstrates the usage of machine learning algorithms 
for both feature selection and classification applied in a context specific environment 
for the detection and localization of cyber intrusions. Specific contributions to the 
areas of power systems, knowledge discovery, and the study of cyberspace include the 
following:
• Extraction and demonstrated utilization of key power system features based on 
system state parameters via dimensional transformation and statistical measures.
• Development of a cyber-event detection framework based on power system 
state parameters through the training and utilization of classification techniques 
including discriminant analysis and principal component analysis.
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• Provides a scalability analysis via the comparison of the detection scheme when 
applied to two different power systems.
• A method for determining stealthy attacks and includes an examination into 
what state parameters are susceptible to these attacks and for what values.
•  Lastly, a detailed description of how the contributions described above can be 
expanded upon for the creation of a high confident detection scheme that merges 
the two cyber and physical perspectives for the detection of cyber incidents in 
critical infrastructure power grid in a manner that is both self verifying and 
complementary.
1.4 Organization
Building off the context creation and statement of the problem provided by 
Chapter 1, Chapter 2 provides the necessary background information for the developed 
detection scheme including a discussion on power flow analysis and a description 
of the knowledge discovery approach. Also, provided in Chapter 2 is a discussion 
on how the developed cyber-event detection scheme will be evaluated. Through a 
discussion of related works, Chapter 3 provides an initial starting point for the scheme 
along with outlining drawbacks of other approaches to the problem. This chapter also 
describes an experiment that was conducted at the early stages of the dissertation 
which addresses some of the key issues with an IT based intrusion detection system.
The details of the approach taken by this dissertation to detect cyber-event 
based on a physical perspective is described in Chapter 4. In addition to these details, 
this chapter also discusses how the scheme could be implemented in a live SCADA
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environment. Chapter 5 describes the many simulation models used to develop and 
test the detection scheme. This includes which power system topologies are being 
used for the analysis along with a discussion of Monte-Carlo power flow simulations. 
Also provided in Chapter 5 is a detailed formalization of the four attack models 
used throughout the dissertation. Chapter 6 discusses the key features extracted for 
the purpose of identification. The next chapter, Chapter 7, determines the exact 
parameters required for the classifiers to perform optimally and are based on a training 
size and statistical constants of the trusted models. Classification results of the 
identification and localization classifiers are presented in Chapters 8 and 9.
Chapter 8 outlines the identification of the presence of cyber-events in a power 
system instance while Chapter 9 discusses the localization or determination of the 
source of the cyber-event. Based of these results, an analysis on stealthy attacks 
was performed and results of this analysis is presented in Chapter 10. Chapter 11, 
outlines the recommendations and conclusions of the developed detection approach. 
The future work, outlined in Chapter 12, proposes some further modifications that 
may increase the true positive classification rate of the developed detection scheme. 
Also, provided in this chapter are several additional aspects of the detection scheme 
that could be considered including the possibility of combining the developed physical 
detection scheme with more traditional IT based detection schemes.
CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
2.1 Overview of Power System s
The critical infrastructure power grid is divided up into three main levels: 
distribution, transmission, and generation. Distribution consists of the customer 
domain and contains the actual delivery of electrical power via feeder circuits while 
stepping down the voltage from the transmission level. Transmission is the bulk 
transport of electrical power from the generating facilities to the distribution level 
via multiple high voltage substations. Lastly, generation focuses on the creation of 
electricity based on the demand as defined by the load at the distribution level.
The primary steady state algorithms that determine the stability and reliability 
of the critical infrastructure power grid are: 1) power flow, 2) optimal power flow, and 
3) state estimation. The power system challenge is to try to solve the nonlinear power 
balance equations in near real time given a percent of system values. The system state 
uses KirchhofFs Law at each power system bus throughout the system in question. 
Kirchhoff’s Law states that the sum of the powers entering a bus must be zero. The 
active and reactive components of the power flow equations in polar representation
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form from bus i to bus j  can be determined by solving Eqs. (2.1) and (2.2).
n
0 =  A Pi = F"l3ec- V i J ^  VjYijCostfi -  Qj -  <pl3) (2.1)
2—1
n
0 =  AQi =  Q™jec - V i 'J T  VjYijsin(9i - 0 3 -  <pl3) (2.2)
i= l
where p™jec and Q^l]ec are the injected powers into each bus, Vt is the voltage on bus 
i and Yi3 is element i j  of the admittance matrix. Optimal power flow is the result 
of finding the desired power system state variables based on one or multiple cost 
functions. Examples of cost functions include minimization on power losses and fuel 
costs of generation. State estimation described the process of estimating the state of 
the power system based on an incomplete picture of the system being observed. With 
state estimation, system parameters are measured using intelligent electronic devices 
(IEDs) and are reported back to the SCADA system.
2.1.1 Power Flow
The goal of the Newton-Raphson method when applied to power system 
analysis is to provide an iterative method for solving the nonlinear algebraic power
flow equations, Eqs. (2.1) and (2.2) [1]. This method is known as being the most
common approach for solving the power flow equations [28]. The Newton-Raphson 
method when applied to solve the power flow problem can be summed up into the 
following five steps. Steps two through five are repeated until convergence or until 
some iteration limit has been reached.
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1. Initialize variables using a flat start.
2. Use Eqs. (2.1) and (2.2) to solve
Ay*W  =
3. Calculate the full Jacobian J  as defined by Eq. (2.6).
4. Use LU factorization to solve for the bus voltages and angles.
AP, P f -iec -  A P *
AQi Q*nJ'ec -  AQi
(2.3)
A di A P <
A Vi AQi
(2.4)
5. Compute the next iteration of angles and voltages using
Xi+l
@i+1 Oi A d i
= +
V J+1 Vi A Vj
(2.5)
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Calculations for the elements of the Jacobian matrix J , Eq. (2.6), are outlined in 
Table 2.1. The use of this method to calculate the Jacobian matrix is thoroughly 
outlined in [1]. For the voltage controlled buses, the voltage magnitudes 14 are already 
known and allowing for the omission of the associated functions in the derivation
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of the Jacobian matrix [1]. This is utilized and noted in the simulation code and 
decreases the computational complexity of the simulation.
Table 2.1: Calculations for the elements of the Jacobian matrix [1].
n ^  k
Jlkn “  3 5 * — Sn 9kn)
J2kn =  =  VfcYknCOs(Sk -  5„ -  Okn)
J3k„ =  = - V kY k n V ncos(6k - S n -  6kn)
J4kn =  fv'T ~  YkYknSin(Sk — Sn — 0kn )
n =  k
Jlkk =  =  -Vfc E " = l,„ * fc Yfc„Vn«n(tffc - S n -  0kn)
J2kk =  =  VfcYkkCOs(9kk) +  E n= l Yfc„V„COs(<5fc - 5 n — Okn)
J3kk = § ±  = Vk  E l l , „ * fc YknVncos(Sk - S n ~  0kn)
J 4 kk =  =  - V fcY kkSin(9kk)  +  E l i  Y fcnV ns m ( 4  -  <5„ -  &fen)
Step six produces a vector of errors e. The goal of the iterative method is to 
decrease the error to a certain point that is declared acceptable. Unless otherwise 
noted, the error stopping point utilized for simulating the power flow via the Newton- 
Raphson method is es =  0.01. This means that the absolute values of both the active 
and reactive power mismatches all have to be below 0.01 to be considered a converging 
instance. Also, for this examination convergence had to occur within 15 iterations or 
the instance was declared a non-converging instance. On average, the 5-bus system 
converged within 4 iterations. The extreme of 15 iterations was selected as a stopping 
point given that if the system did not converge within 15 iterations it is likely for that 
given set of inputs the system can not exists. The fact of non-convergence corresponds 
to the likelihood that the power system being observed does not exist at that given set 
of inputs. A flat start means that, for simulation purposes, all non-voltage controlled 
busses are assumed to have a voltage of 1 per unit while all angles are assumed to
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be zero. For a more detailed description of the iterative solutions to the power flow 
problem, the reader is encouraged to view the following referenced text [28, 1,2].
2.1.2 State Estim ation
State estimation is one of the primary steady state algorithms that help to 
determine the stability and reliability of a power system [28]. The process of estimating 
the state of the system plays a pivotal role in the development of the detection approach 
presented in this dissertation. In most installations of a power system, not all state 
parameters can be measured. This could be the cause of any number of reasons 
ranging from cost of instrumentation installation to device failure. Therefore, there is 
a need to be able to derive or estimate those state parameters via other observable 
parameters. It is noted that a good state estimation algorithm will be able to smooth 
out small errors in measurements, detect and identify large measurement errors, and 
compensate for missing data [28].
One main underlying assumption of the state estimation process is that the 
measurement error of variables being observed follow a normal (or Gausian) probability 
density function of zero mean described by
This assumption is generally accepted in the formulation of the power system state
exact, what is actually being observed or measured can be represented in vector form 
[29, 6, 30], as z =  (zl5 z2, • • •, zm)T in
(2.7)
estimation problem [6]. Since it is possible that the observed state parameters are not
z =  h(x) +  v. ( 2 .8 )
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For Eq. (2.8), v  =  (vlt i>2, . . . ,  v m ) T  is the measurement error that contains the 
uncertainty in the measurement and h(x) =  (/q(x), ^ ( x ) , . . . ,  hm(x))T is the vector 
of the nonlinear functions relating each measurement to the state variables x  =  
(xi ,x2, . . .  , x n)T. W ith the formalization of Eq. (2.8), it can be said that the goal 
of the state estimation problem is to find an estimate x  for x  that is a best fit for 
the measurements z. The error e is simply the difference between the true values 
measured and the estimated measured values. The search for such a x  that minimizes
m ^
m i n f  =  Y ]  ~ j l z i ~  h i i x )}2 (2-9 )
i =  1
can be determined using an iterative process such as the Newton-Raphson method. 
With each iteration represented as
-fc+i =  ±k + (H(x kf  R - 1 H( xk) ) - ' H ( x kf  R - 'i z  -  h(xk)), (2.10)
the result can be calculated using a Taylor series expansion on the functions h(x) 
around a point x fe [6]. In Eq. (2.10), H{x) = denotes a Jacobian m atrix formed 
via the partials of the h(x).
2.2 M ultivariate Analysis
With today’s computational capabilities, analytical techniques for multivariate 
analysis can be implemented with much less cost. Multivariate analysis (MA) describes 
the aggregate of techniques and algorithms used to analyze observations which contain 
multiple features. Such techniques are useful in that they help to untangle the 
redundant information to reveal the interesting and normally hidden information. 
This section provides the necessary background information regarding techniques
in multivariate analysis necessary for the development of the detection framework 
presented in this dissertation. Notation developed in this section will be consistently 
used throughout the dissertation when possible.
Letting ^  be a vector consisting of m  variables and representing a single 
observation, the ith observation can be fully denoted in vector format as
Thus, it can be stated that Xi is the mean vector of the first feature and x m is the mean 
vector of the last feature. By using this notation a data matrix X  that encapsulates 
all n  observations of m  different features can be defined as
(2 . 11)
A sample mean vector x  for the j th variable or feature consisting of n  observations is
determined by
( 2 . 12)
^-1,1 ' ‘ ' ^-1 ,j ‘ ‘ ' ^ 1  ,m
(2.13)
The population mean of the data matrix Eq. (2.13) can be calculated as
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and is an extension of the sample mean vector Eq. (2.11). It is also often desired 
to know how the variables vary within themselves and vary with respect to other 
variables. A square dispersion matrix represents just this in the form of variances
or sample covariance matrix S can be expressed in terms of the population mean as 
shown in
The closer the off-diagonal terms of S are to zero the closer the features represented 
by the indices of S are to being completely uncorrelated. Conversely, the higher these 
off-diagonal terms are the more correlated the two features are. Also, the higher the 
off diagonal terms are the higher the redundancy is in the data matrix X. Using the 
terms, of the covariance matrix S, a correlation matrix R  can be created that 
describes the dependency between features in
(the diagonal terms) and covariances (the off diagonal terms). This dispersion matrix
(2.15)
In cases of a zero-mean data matrix, Eq. (2.15) reduces to
S =  — 5— X TX. 
71—1
(2.16)
1 r l ,2 ^l,m— 1 T\,m
U-,1 1
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A more direct and less computationally expensive approach to calculating R  is to create 





R =  D 1S D 1 =
0 . y/ Smm
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0 . \ /  Smm
2.3 Knowledge Discovery
Many advancements have been made in recent years in the areas of data 
mining (DM) and knowledge discovery in databases (KDD) [31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37]. 
Most of the advancements are in the area of algorithm development with only a few 
works presenting a detailed discussion on the usage of DM and KDD approaches to 
securing the cyberinfrastructure of the critical infrastructure power grid [38, 39, 40, 41]. 
This section provides the necessary background information regarding data mining 
and knowledge discovery necessary for the development of the detection framework 
presented in this dissertation.
The primary objective of DM and more generally KDD is to discover useful 
information from a large dataset. These processes describe the algorithms and overall 
implementation techniques utilized for the extraction of information. KDD describes 
the overall process starting with the collection and storage of raw data and ending with
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details for representing the information concluded via the examination. A depiction 
of the knowledge discovery process (KDP) is shown in Figure 2.1 and is derived from 
multiple sources including [32, 37]. This process though generalized has five main 
steps and outlines the hierarchical structure for the detection framework developed in 
this dissertation. The details of each step are discussed below.
---------------------------------  Knowledge Discovery-------------------------------------
Input — t  step 1 ----- ► Step 2 ——► Step 3 - ...""I Step 4 ¥ Output
fe ta l Sanitization Transformation Data Mining Feature Knowledge
t J  Evaluation Representation
Figure 2.1: General Knowledge Discovery Process
1. Sanitization: Before information can be extracted, the data must undergo 
cleansing in order to remove noise and eliminate any inconsistent data. For 
simplicity, the selection of data is included in this step and involves the extraction 
of attributes of the original dataset to be analyzed. This could include the 
extraction of all attributes of the original dataset or a subset.
2. Transformation: Once cleansed the data needs to, in most cases, be trans­
formed in some manner in order for the next step to be performed. An example 
of this is a dimensional transformation in which the information is presented 
in a new kernel or vector space. The type of technique used in the next step 
defines the type of transformation the data must undergo.
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3. D ata Mining: The data mining process uses various analysis tools and 
techniques for the extraction of patterns/knowledge. Some examples of tools 
and techniques include associative rule mining, clustering analysis along with 
prediction and classification methods.
4. Feature Evaluation: In most cases, not every pattern identified by the data 
mining approach can be considered relevant or interesting. This step identifies 
the patterns that are relevant to the analysis and validates those patterns based 
on multiple measures.
5. K nowledge Representation: The final stage of the KDD process details the 
clear and direct technique used to present the information to the user. This is 
generally done in the form of a graphical representation, i.e. an alarm.
D ata mining is often described as the process of analyzing large amounts of 
data in some domain for the primary purpose of mining or extracting what would 
be normally hidden patterns or knowledge [37]. Extraction of patterns involves the 
discovery of implicit structures in the data or a detailed description of the data through 
a high level abstraction. Instead of just sifting the data, this dissertation seeks to 
present results in terms of a KD process (KDP) that can be implemented in an actual 
environment. A KDP model is then developed as the final framework model with a 
detailed description of model inputs and decisions produced by the output.
2.3.1 Learning Techniques
The two main types of learning techniques are unsupervised learning and 
supervised learning. Unsupervised learning involves the process that automatically
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discovers formations in a dataset without the use of labels. Some examples of this 
type of learning include clustering and associative rule mining. Supervised learning 
predicts the existence of hidden patterns based on the information gained from a 
training set. Training sets consist of a set of observations containing a finite number 
of features and a classification label for each observation. The result of these methods 
place newly observed instances into labels based on the hidden patterns.
2.3.2 D etection  via Classification
Detection via classification is the designation of observations or instances into 
classes based on a deterministic classification. Classes, in the case of this dissertation, 
can be in the form of a dichotomy placing instances into either class based on 
a minimization of a cost function. These classification approaches determine the 
likelihood that the instance or observation exists within each class and classifies 
according to the class that contains the highest likelihood value.
2.3.3 Validation
In order to examine the success of the developed detection scheme, several 
techniques for validation are utilized. To aid in and determine the success of the 
developed detection scheme, two main validation techniques were utilized: a) validation 
of machine learning algorithms, and b) validation of developed detection scheme. Each 
validation type encompasses a set of sub validation schemes and includes:
Validation of M achine Learning Algorithm s:
a Split, Cross Validation and Bootstrapping are methods by which the training
set and test set are rotated through the developed knowledge discovery 
algorithm for testing purposes. Though computationally more expensive,
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Bootstrapping provides a means to quantify the error of the KDD model 
[37].
b Confusion Matrix, Figure 2.2, compares the successful classification into 
















Figure 2.2: Classification Matrix
c Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curves allow for the visual 
comparison of two or more classifiers and is a plot of True Positive rate vs 
False Positive rate [37]. 
d Minimum Description Length Principle (MPL) states that the complexity 
of a model M  is measured by the length L of bits needed to encode the 
theory, plus the number of bits needed to encode the data D  using the 
theory [37, 42], This is a quantification of model performance and is shown 
as a minimization on min[L(M)  +  L(D\M)\.
Validation of D eveloped D e tec tio n  Sch em e:  Not only are the developed 
machine learning algorithms tested against the rigors of the KDD discipline, the
25
approach also needs to be tested against the rigors of the application. Under this
validation of the detection scheme, the following metrics were used to determine
and compare the overall success of the unified approach.
a Comparison with Existing Bad Data Detection Schemes: Some techniques
for power system bad data detection do exists and are utilized in the
monitoring of live systems [28]. These more traditional approaches were
compared on the basis of 1) time for conclusion and 2) successfulness
to detect. Traditional detection schemes are computationally expensive
[43, 44, 30, 45] and are vulnerable to multi-attribute attacks as revealed in
[46, 47, 48] and therefore will provide a basis for comparing the developed
methods.
b Topological Assessment will consist of a study on scalability and versatility. 
Scalable validation consists of a vertical approach focusing on increasing 
the size of n (the number of buses to analyze) while versatility will be 
horizontal in nature and is a test on different configurations of n. 
c Operational Analysis describes the assessment on the required computa­
tional cost for the developed approach. Validation of this type consists of a 




Many approaches have already been developed and continue to be developed 
to protect the critical infrastructure power grid. However, most of these efforts focus 
on security from a control reliability perspective and not a cybersecurity perspective. 
This is in part the result of the fact that the power grid is just now becoming interlaced 
with networked control devices. Furthermore, it has long been realized the value 
of knowledge discovery for various applications in the intrusion detection systems 
(IDS). Many surveys and review articles have been written on the subject and truly 
demonstrate the success of its application in the domain of detection for security 
[49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 39]. However, a clear distinction must be made between the power 
system’s traditional security concern of reliability and the much more recent concern of 
power system cybersecurity. This is not to say that the warranted distinction implies 
mutual exclusivity, only that it is needed for a thorough literary review on current 
power system security methods. This chapter provides an overview of past and current 
efforts for power grid security along with a detailed examination of current IT based 
cyber-event detection schemes along with an examination at current approaches to 
cyber-event detection based on a physical perspective.
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3.2 Bad D ata D etection via State Estim ation
Traditional approaches to intrusion detection are based on bad data detection 
via state estimation. Though not directly labeled as knowledge discovery through 
data mining, some of the techniques and statistical measures for securing the power 
grid focus on examining reported state parameters and the resulting state estimation. 
Such techniques include the bad data detection schemes presented in [43, 44, 30, 45] 
and analysis of variance techniques as those presented in [40]. These approaches 
examine reported state parameters on an instance by instance base and utilize circuit 
theory equations for the detection of anomalies in the resulting state estimation. Data 
anomalies are then labeled as bad data resulting from measurement errors or faulty 
equipment.
Early implementation of data mining approaches to bad data detection include 
the works of [46, 47, 48], wherein neurons are created that use patterns formulated 
based on historical or training datasets. Artificial intelligence is used in some of these 
approaches; however, these approaches do not utilize historical state parameters to 
reach conclusions. Rather these techniques use neurons for faster convergence of the 
state estimation process. Bad data detection in power systems can be accomplished 
alongside the state estimation process. State estimation, described previously in 
Section 2.1.2, mathematically derives a best estimate of the power system even in the 
presence of bad data. Throughout most of the literature, the objective function to be 
minimized in the state estimation process is considered to be related to a Chi square 
distribution.
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Some attempts at the detection of injected state parameters via data mining 
approaches has been performed [54]. However, these approaches are still in their 
infancy and have no clearly defined structure for algorithmic implementation as that 
described in other applications of data mining. D ata mining on load profiling has 
been examined in multiple texts where, for instance, decision trees are built via a 
temporal analysis [55].
3.3 D ata M ining for Power Grid Security
An extensive survey of data mining approaches for power system security was 
conducted in [38] and [39] with a full text on the subject presented in [40, 41]. Most 
of the classification approaches use decision trees. However, the actual objects being 
analyzed range from transient stability to steady state power flows. Though not 
specific to the context of intrusion detection, the works of [56, 57, 58, 38] demonstrate 
successful implementations of machine learning algorithms for power system security 
focusing on control reliability. Using decision trees, actual [58] and modeled [57] 
power system data is used to build models for the purpose of establishing preventive 
measures for stabilization in instances of required contingencies. In [58], decision 
trees are also used for contingency analysis; however, the technique utilized is the 
Iterative Dichotoinizer 3 (IDS) process and is based on the entropy of the dataset being 
analyzed. This ID3 algorithm is similar to the one utilized for power flow contingency 
analysis in [58].
29
3.4 Cyber-Event D etection  via an IT Perspective
IT based intrusion detection offers another perspective into a possible detection 
scheme that uses computer based communication metadata and features that utilize 
standard protocols for the detection of anomalies. In the early stages of this dissertation, 
effort was taken to create attack vectors targeting control system applications and 
determine potential detection schemes for these vectors. This section explains some of 
these results amongst other IT based detection schemes for industrial control systems. 
3.4.1 Proof o f Concept ICS Attack
In an effort to explore IT based ICS intrusion detection schemes, an exploit using 
a known vulnerability was crafted and used against the Siemens S7-1200 programable 
logic controller (PLC) [59]. One major attack performed was a replay attack wherein 
legitimate command and control packets where captured, malformed, and re-injected 
into a simulated control LAN for a critical power application. This section describes 
the observations made during the attacks, focusing on the time differences between 
legitimate and spoofed command and control packets.
The experimental setup for testing involved four machines: the engineer’s 
work station, the attackers work station, the monitoring workstation, and the Simatic 
S7-1200 PLC. The engineer’s work station comes with Siemens Totally Integrated 
Automation Portal on a Windows 7 machine. The attacking machine is running 
Backtrack5r3 which has Wireshark, tcpreplay, and the Metasploit Framework 4.5.0 
pre-installed. The experimental network topology is shown in Figure 3.1 and is based 
on the mirroring functionality of the switch connected to the control center to the
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WAN. All traffic sent to the WAN is then mirrored to the monitoring workstation via 
the mirrored port. This type of assumption allows for the possibility that the attack 
can originate from either an outsider or insider threat, someone already inside the 
corporate network, i.e. disgruntle employee. The devices that encompass a control 
LAN have been discovered to be ’accidentally’ connected to the Internet and are not 
isolated on an internal network [12]. Figure 3.1 shows the network topology for the 












F igure  3.1: IT Based Detection Experimental Network Topology
While the exploits were being launched, the network traffic was being captured 
using the network analysis tool Wireshark by the monitoring workstation as shown in 
Figure 3.1. This allowed for a direct comparison in the time sequencing information 
between legitimate and spoofed command and control packets. Due to the severity 
of the attacks and the corresponding functionality granted to the engineer, a DoS
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attack was used as the basis for comparison between legitimate and spoofed packets 
from the network traffic. A custom python script was used to extract the conversation 
streams based on the TC P/IP  SYN flag of the start packet and the ACK flag of the 
subsequent packets in that conversation. The script also provided the difference in 
the timestamp of start SYN packets and all ACK packets in the TCP stream. In 
comparing the legitimate and spoofed packet streams, substantial time differences 
were found.
A total of six streams were plotted for both the attack and the command and 
control (CC) T C P /IP  conversations to the controller. The resulting TC P streams 
from both the engineer and attacker are plotted in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, respectively. 
This observation can be numerically shown, where the timestamp for two streams are 
compared side by side. The legitimate stream, Figure 3.2, is a plot of the timestamp 
information of the packets from the control engineer while the attack timestamps, 
Figure 3.3 is a plot of the timestamps from the attacker stream. The delay shown is a 
direct result of the nature of the attack being conducted. The attack was executed 
using Metasploit modules, and as a result, it operates within the confines of the 
software application. Each packet had to be crafted individually with the payload 
stripped from the original control engineer’s TCP packet stream. These findings 
suggest a unit of measure that may be used in future detection schemes which can 
differentiate between legitimate and spoofed command and control packets. However, 
these IT based metrics would not be able to detect a more sophisticated attack. An 
example of this would be if the engineer’s computer become the source of the attack 
with or without the engineer’s knowledge. Such a detection scheme would break down
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as there is no longer an accurate basis for classification. It is for this reason the 
dissertation shifted in a search for a much more robust and context specific detection 
approach.
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Figure 3.3: Attacker’s Control Packet Timestamps
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3.5 Cyber-Event D etection  via a Physical Perspective
Only recently has cyber-event detection via the physical perspective been 
viewed as a reasonable option. This in part may be the result of the ever increasing 
computational power and communication capabilities of power system control and 
monitoring devices. In fact, several approaches use the distributed computational 
power for event detection and include [60, 61, 62, 63]. For instance, one possible 
approach to consider is the use of a state estimation data filter in a distributed 
manner to detect cyber attacks locally [60]. One drawback of these distributed 
approaches, however, is the increased latency on an already burdened control priority 
communication channels.
A very unique approach to the detection of data integrity attacks in a power 
system is presented in the work of Sridhar et al. [64]. In this approach, a physical 
perspective is used to detect the presence of state variable attacks focusing only on the 
controller for an automatic generator. Detection is based on real-time load forecasters 
which predict the generation operation over a given period of time. If the real time 
operation deviates from the predicted model based on the load forecasters, then a 
possible cyber-event has been detection.
More closely related to the approach developed by this dissertation, the 
approach presented by Coutinho et al. [65] uses the SC ADA’s historian databases 
for the detection of cyber-events. The particular classifier used is stated as a ” rough 
classification algorithm” with little mathematical discussion on exactly how it detects 
the presence of cyber-events and is performed on a 6-Bus power system. In an early 
paper [66] by the authors, it was suggested that the rules are derived based on a
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’rough set’ of data stored in a trusted model. The derivation of rules correspond to 
deviation trees used to determine the bounds of a value under a certain set of other 
correlated values. In a more recent article by Giani et al. [67], the detection of state 
variable attack is performed using graphically defined observable islands that form both 
naturally and in the presence of cyber-events. By comparing the islands of a trusted 
model with a suspect observation, discrepancies can be identified. The drawbacks of 
this unique formalization is that it assumed DC load flow and lossless lines. These 
assumptions lessen the amount of correlated features that can be extracted.
3.6 Conclusions
A multitude of approaches exist for the detection of cyber-events in the power 
grid. Few, however, take into account the vast amount of information stored in 
historical SCADA databases. Furthermore, most of the approaches are based on IT 
centric solutions which require constant access control and patch updates. A direct 
example of the shortcomings of IT based solutions to the problem is outlined in [5] 
where it is stated that a government audit of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) 
revealed several security issues. These issues included several misconfigurations of the 
DMZ firewalls along with several accounts which had no password for remote access. 
The audit also revealed that several of TVA’s control servers were not up to date with 
the current patches.
Though not as well defined, approaches that utilize a physical perspective, 
appear to have the least devastating effect on a power system environment. Only a few 
of these cyber-event detection approaches exist with even fewer utilizing the complete
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set of information that can be derived from analyzing historical SCADA databases. 
Also, as revealed by this chapter, the majority of the work being explored focuses 
on data mining approaches to the aspect of reliability security and not necessarily 
intrusion detection for security. This dissertation seeks to fill these gaps by the 
development and testing of a cyber-event detection framework based on uniquely 
crafted machine learning and classification algorithms that harness the topological 
power system knowledge stored in historical databases.
CHAPTER 4
DETECTION VIA STATE VARIABLES
Detection via state variables, as it is developed in this dissertation, describes 
the utilization of historical and contingency power system attributes combined with the 
topological knowledge of the power system for the successful detection and localization 
of cyber intrusions. By observing high level grouping phenomenon [68] in the reported 
state parameters, it is possible to replace a group of variables with a single new 
variable, greatly reducing the redundancy in the data. Examples of reported power 
systems state parameters include among others: bus voltages and angles, active and 
reactive powers of generators and loads. Figure 4.1 shows the overall process, the 
approach taken by this dissertation, and depicts where this detection scheme can be 
placed relative to an actual power system application. The state variable detection 
scheme developed throughout this dissertation utilizes multiple transmission systems 
for both the feature extraction and classification of malicious cyber activity in the 
power systems. The four main steps for this approach are described below Figure
4.1 and include the following: data aggregation , pattern  recognition , hybrid  
classification, and node(s) identification.
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Figure 4.1: Detection Via State Variables Approach
1. D ata Aggregation:
Data aggregation is accomplished by combining all available information 
used to describe the power system. Available information is the result of a) 
past states, b) contingency states, and c) current incoming state X as shown in 
Figure 4.1. Past states are contained in the Historian of most SCADA systems 
and represent true dynamics of the observed system. Contingency states are the 
result of load profiling and estimates in the power flow based on operational 
planning. The current state X consists of all currently observed power system 
attributes. All this information was then accumulated during each experiment 
to provide an extensive training set for algorithm development.
2. Pattern Recognition:
Pattern recognition is the result of information retrieval methodologies 
wherein patterns from the large datasets are extracted. Such patterns were 
extracted via the extensive analysis on the data aggregated, which contains a
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collection of power system states. Dimensionality reduction and kernel transfor­
mations into different dimensional spaces provided a means for the extraction of 
information (patterns) provided by a decrease in redundant information.
3. Hybrid Classification:
Classification is the process whereby exploiting the features identified 
through pattern recognition. Hybrid classification leverages multiple patterns to 
reach a successful classification. Such an approach guarantees a higher likelihood 
of true positive classification.
4. N ode(s) Identification:
The classification of each state is based on the hybrid approaches and 
feature extraction methods developed. Two cases exists for node identification. 
In the case where the classification of state X into the malicious class is based off 
a single attribute, then that attribute can be classified as malicious and trigger 
an alarm for further investigation. In contrast, if the overall state X is deemed 
malicious first, then further analysis was performed to identify the node or nodes 
that are at the root of the alert.
4.1 Im plem entation
As noted in Figure 4.1, the detection scheme developed by this dissertation is 
designed to be implemented alongside an existing SCADA system. Using the data 
aggregated from the Historian and from contingency analysis, new power system 
instances or observations are classified as either containing or not containing a cyber­
event. Given the close proximity to the SCADA system, this approach can be
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implemented in a live manner, classifying newly observed instances. Furthermore, this 
detection scheme is designed to be 100% passive in that it only reads from control LAN 
databases and does not issue commands to any control devices. Upon classification of 
a cyber-event, an alarm is triggered, alerting a security investigator or control engineer 
of the potential intrusion. Lastly, this detection scheme may also be implemented in a 
manner that can help forensically identify a cyber-event. This particular utilization of 
the developed detection scheme is outlined in Section 12.3.
4.2 Approach Overview
The developed cyber-event detection approach finds its power in the utilization 
of historical and contingency power system states. The approach described is illustrated 
in Figure 4.2. The detection scheme starts by first taking in the newly observed power 
system instance. This new instance represents the state of the power system at a given 
point in time and can include both measured and derived terms. Terms include state 
parameters that represent bus voltages, bus angles, line flows, real power supplied, 
reactive power supplied, real power consumed, and reactive power consumed. Upon 
the classification into the cyber-event set, the observed power system instance is then 
analyzed to find the source of the cyber-event. This approach takes into consideration 
the time and computational requirements for such an intrusion detection scheme. It is 
for this reason the developed detection scheme takes place in phases with advances to 
the next phase only occurring if required. Sections 4.3 - 4.5 explain each step in detail.
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Figure 4.2: Approach Flow Chart
4.3 Convergence Classification
Convergence classification is performed as the first test and analyzes a subset 
of power system state variables. The subset variables contain the power system state 
variables that are the inputs to the power flow problem which is solved using the 
Newton-Raphson method [28]. Convergence classification is based on the fact that 
due to topological constraints and the fundamental circuit laws, Eqs. (2.1) and (2 .2)
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[1], the power system can only exists for a certain set of values. By performing several 
Monte Carlo simulations, as explained in Section 5.3, a full set of converging and 
non-converging power system instances were created.
The newly created converging and non-converging power system instances are 
used as training sets to train discriminant classifiers to classify newly observed power 
system instances. By testing a set of observed power system state parameters in the 
context of convergence, it can be determined whether or not those values make sense. 
Recall that non-converging power system instances represent a set of values where the 
system cannot exist and therefore warrants further investigation. Several discriminant 
classifiers were tested for this effort and include: linear, diagonal linear, quadratic, 
and diagonal quadratic.
4.3.1 Convergence Feature
Feature extraction based on power flow convergence exploits the information 
gained from knowing the power system before hand. A power system observation 
is bounded by topological, generation, and load constraints and based on those 
constraints will supply the required power to the load. In a simulated environment, 
the steady state dynamics of a power system can be obtained using an iterative method 
such as the Newton-Raphson method [28].
This approach assumes that all converging instances of the Newton-Raphson 
method represent observable or possible parameters of the power system. Non­
converging instances however represent a set of inputs for which the system cannot 
exists; the system cannot handle that set of inputs and is therefore protected against
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those set of inputs. These non-converging instances are labeled as belonging to a 
malicious set. By using the two classes of inputs, converging and non-converging 
(benign and malicious) instances, any number of classifiers can be used to predict the 
class of the incoming power system observation. The process for constructing the two 











F ig u re  4.3: Building Classification Dataset
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The training sets for both classes (benign and malicious) represent a near full 
range of possible instances of the 5-Bus power system. To guarantee this near full 
range of parameters, the inputs to the power simulation had to be properly chosen, 
then convergence was determined. If the simulated power system converges for a 
given set of power flow inputs X ^ ^ ^ { i ) ,  then it is possible that the state parameters 
described within this set may occur in a live system and therefore added to the class 
ci. If the set of inputs did not converge, then that set of inputs X ^ ^ { i )  was added 
to the malicious class c2. This continued until both classes cxand c2 exceeded a size of 
100 ,000 .
4.3.2 Discriminant Classification
Used as a means of classification, generally in cases of a dichotomy, techniques 
for discriminant analysis are used to place instances or observations into two or more 
classes, c i,q , • • • , cn with n  being the number of classes for classification [37]. For 
development purposes, a total of five discriminant classifiers were tested and include: 
linear, diagonal linear, quadratic, and diagonal quadratic. Once a discriminant 
classifier has been built, subsequent instances can be mapped into the classes based 
on the values of the features or variables describing the observation. The goal of 
discriminant analysis can be described as an extension on Bayes’ Rule, whose formal 
definition is derived from the axioms of probability. This rule defines a solution to 
the question of what is the probability that event B  occurs given that event A  has 
already occurred, formally P(B\A). Using the two class structure described in Section 
4.3.1, four classifiers are trained and tested iteratively against each set. The classifiers
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analyzed include: linear discriminate analysis, diagonal linear discriminate analysis, 
quadratic discriminate analysis, and diagonal quadratic discriminate analysis. Several 
common evaluation methods are used to determine the best classifier for this particular 
type of analysis. These and similar analysis of variance (ANOVA) techniques have 
had successful implementation in many disciplines [69] including the area of power 
systems [70, 71, 72, 73]. However, these works do not provide a detailed examination 
on the utilization of discriminate analysis for the detection of cyber intrusions.
Discriminate analysis seeks to determine the conditional probability of each 
instance given a multivariate vector x  of variables j .  This process evaluates the 
probability that observation x, can be placed into the class q , P (q  |xj). Observations 
or instances are then designated as members of the class for which P (q |x j)  is the 
greatest or lowest depending on the classifier used. In the case of a dichotomy and 
using a highest value classifier, if P(c2|x.t) > P (c1|xi), then the observation x, can be 
labeled as belonging to the class c2. We now can define a discriminant function for 
class i as 4,(x) =  P(c,|x). The boundary between the two classes is the region for 
which the discriminate functions are equal, <5j(x) =  5j+i(x). By extrapolating Bayes’ 
Rule to the context of discriminate functions, it can be shown that
5i(x) =  In p(x|cj) +  In P(Cj|x) (4.1)
holds true [74],[37], wherep(x|q) is the probability distribution functions for the feature 
vector x contained within the class c,. Assuming a multivariate normal Gaussian 
distribution of the feature vectors within each class, the probability distribution
45
function can be defined as
=  /o J 'l c  , i exP[~^(x  -  t o f ^ ' i *  “  to)]- (4-2)
(27r)a |S i |3  2
By plugging Eq. (4.2) into (4.1) and expanding the logarithms while dropping the 
constant term, the quadratic discriminant function can be obtained. Any constant 
terms can be eliminated given that the functions are used to make a decision and 
are the same for all classes. In the case of a dichotomy, this can be formally seen by 
defining a dichotomizer as d(x) =  <5i(:r) — ^(rc). If the dichotomizer is positive, then 
the discriminate function for C\ is higher than that of class c2; thus, the instance can 
be classified a class 1 instance. The constant terms of the discriminate functions will 
cancel.
Linear
Linear discriminant analysis (LDA) assumes that the covariances are equal
for all classes (S, =  Si+1 =  S) [75]. After expanding the quadratic and dropping the
constant covariance term the linear discriminant function,
<̂ (x ) =  ^ fS _1x -  ^ f S ^ V i  +  lnP(cj), (4.3)
can be obtained, where P (q ) is the priori probability distribution function for class i. 
A special type of LDA is the diagonal linear discriminant analysis (DLDA) for which 
the covariance matrix S in Eq. 4.3 is set to be a diagonal matrix.
Quadratic
In cases where the covariance matrixes are not the same for all the classes, the 
quadratic discriminant analysis (QDA) method can be used. Derived directly from
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the logarithmic expansion of the probability distribution function, the discriminate 
function for quadratic cases can be calculated using
5i(x) =  “ ln|Si| -  ~ (x  -  i n f  S r ^ x  -  fr) +  lnP(ci), (4.4)
where P(ci) is the priori probability distribution function for class i. Similar to LDA 
a special type of QDA is the diagonal quadratic discriminant analysis (DQDA) for 
which the covariance matrix S in Eq. (4.4) is set to be a diagonal matrix.
4.4 Instance Classification
Upon classification into the converging set via the discriminant classifier, each 
newly observed power system proceeds to the next test. This next test seeks to compare 
the newly observed power system observation to past observations to determine if it 
is an in-control power system instance. Every observable power system state variable 
is used in this second test covering the greatest amount of features. Classification 
is performed using a dimensional transformation scheme that transforms the power 
system instance into a new dimensional space where each axis is reflective of the 
covariances found in the training set. If the instance as a whole passes the second test, 
then it is considered an in-control instance, one that is possible given topology and 
historical knowledge, and the instance is classified as not having a cyber-event. The 
alternative to being classified as an in-control instance is if the discriminant classifier 
labels the newly observed instances as an out-of-control instance. If this is the case 
then localization is performed immediately.
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4.4.1 Feature Extraction via Transformation
In any determinable system there generally is a finite number of driving forces 
which governs how the system behaves. By observing grouping phenomenon in the 
data, it is possible to replace a group of variables with a single new variable, greatly 
reducing the redundancy in the data. Principle component analysis (PCA) is a 
quantitative process for achieving a system simplification. A decrease in redundancy 
and an overall simplification of the data is made possible through a  transformation 
into a  new vector space where all the basis vectors are independent of each other. 
The basis vectors in the new dimensional space are called principal components. The 
complete set of orthogonal principle components mapped to the new space form what 
are called the orthogonal basis vectors for the data [37].
Perhaps one of the most commonly used statistical analysis linear transforma­
tion tools [37], PCA is based on the statistics of a training set to transform the set
linearly in such a way that the new primary basis are independent of each other. The
linear transformation used is based on a covariance m atrix which is defined by the 
patterns found in the training set. PCA finds a linear transformation such that
Y  =  W X , (4.5)
where X and Y  are mxn  matrices related by a transformation W . Based on Eq. (4.5) 
the following variables can be defined:
• w; are the rows of W
• Xi are the columns of X
• yj are the columns of Y.
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The row vectors of W  {w \ , ..., wm} are called the principal components of x. Before 
PCA can be applied to a dataset, it is first customary to preform a certain amount of 
sanitization on the data. This sanitization guarantees any unintended biassing of the 
new components.
Centering and Norm alization
One aspect of sanitization is to ensure that the data matrix X  is centered and 
normalized. Centering of the data matrix is accomplished by using the mean vector 
/x =  i?[x] =  E [ x 2], ..., £̂ [a?i6]] where E [ x j] is the mean of the first column of
the data matrix X. These values are then subtracted from the associated columns to 
produce a centered data matrix X c. W ith this notation, a new data matrix X  with 
dimensions mxn is created where each instance or run of the simulation produces a 
column vector. For instance, the first row of data matrix X c produces a column vector 
3li. This representation of the instances enables the creation of the new data matrix
From here the normalized covariance Sx was determined using the unbiased 
estimator for normalization using
X, where




This produced a covariance matrix with dimensions raxra with the diagonal terms 
representing the variances and the off-diagonal terms representing the covariances of 
data matrix X. The closer the off-diagonal terms are to zero, the closer the variables 
represented by the indices of Sx are to being completely uncorrelated. Conversely, the 
higher these off-diagonal terms are, the more correlated the two variables are. Also, 
the higher the off-diagonal terms are, the higher the redundancy is in the data matrix 
X.
Solving P C A
The linear transformation produced by PCA selects a transformation W  such 
that the principle components or basis vectors Wi produced are completely orthonomal. 
Orthonomality is ensured due to the fact that the dot product of each basis vector 
with another produces the Kronecker delta function, w{-Wj =  St]. In addition to being 
orthonormal, the basis vectors are ordered based on the amount of variance that is 
being accounted for by that basis vector or principal component. This corresponds to 
the fact that PCA will produce a transformation matrix W  such that the variance of 
data matrix X is mostly accounted for by principal component wj.
The goal of PCA is to produce a transformation where little to no redundancy 
can be seen in the new vector space. As mentioned in the previous section, the lower 
the diagonal terms of the covariance matrix are, the lower the redundancy is in the 
data. Therefore, the solution to PCA seeks a covariance matrix Sy such that the 
off-diagonal terms are zero where,
SY =  —-— Y Y r . (4.8)
n — 1
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Plugging Eq. (4.5) into Eq. (4.8) we have
SY -  —!-j-W (XXT)W T. (4.9)
W ith this solution to PCA, it can be shown that the principal components of data 
matrix X  are the eigenvectors of X X T or are the rows of W . Also, the ith diagonal 
term of Sy is the variance of X  projected onto pj.
4.4.2 Classification
To use PCA for detection, we seek a method where for a suspicious data matrix 
X', this data can be projected into the new dimensional space and statistical inferences 
made such that the successful identification of malicious instance X 'm is possible. 
If malicious instance X 'm does not follow the statistical trends identified by PCA 
using the training set X, it can be classified as a potential malicious instance. Once 
classified the instance, then it can be further investigated to identify the cause of 
the compromised reading xV This would allow the investigator or control engineer 
to isolate the intrusion. An example of this would be if, for system = 5bus, x'3 was 
found to be the malicious term in the malicious vector X 'm and x'3 corresponded to 
V 5 as shown in Table 4.1, then this would mean that the voltage at bus 5 has been 
compromised.
Table 4.1: 5-Bus Data Matrix Features
V a r ia b le N e w  V a r ia b le N o te s
V T W E n V T V s X i  -  x 5 Voltages
x 6 -  x 9 Voltage Angles
p g u p g 3 ^10 — X i \ Real Power Generated
Q G \ , Q G 3 X \2  -  X i 3 Reactive Power Generated
P L \  -  P L b X \ A  ~ Real Power Load
Q L \  — Q L 5 —  x 2 'i Reactive Power Load
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H otelling’s T 2
The Hotelling’s T 2 value,
T 2 =  n(X  -  /i)'S_1(X -  fj), (4.10)
is an extension of the t-test used to determine the difference between means of 
two independent variables. This extension allows for a statistical measure of the 
multivariate distance of each instance from the center of a dataset. The result allows 
for the detection of instances that occur at far distances from the data center as 
defined by data matrix X. The detection approach presented in this dissertation is 
a probabilistic approach in describing how likely an instance is to occur. Instances 
that fit to the dynamics of the data matrix X  or control set have a high likelihood of 
occurring while instances that lie on the boundaries are less likely to occur. It can also 
be shown [76] that the Hotelling’s T2 value follows the T  distribution as defined by
7,2 ~  (411 )
where p is the number of principal components retained and n  is the number of 
instances in the sample space. The T  cumulative probability distribution function 
returns the cumulative probability of obtaining a value x  for given parameters p and 
n. By rearranging Eq. (4.11), we can calculate that the probability of observing at 
least T 2 is
P(> T 2) =  1 -  (4.12)
where
-  = T 2 (71 -  P) 
p(n — 1)
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The new formulazation allows for a probabilistic metric to determine whether 
or not an instance is in-control. If the instance is in-control, then it follows the 
dynamics as defined by the data matrix X. A low probability, as defined by Eq. (4.12), 
for observing at least that T 2 corresponds to a high T 2 value. This means tha t the 
instance is far away from the multivariate center and therefore is least likely to occur. 
Conversely, a high probability corresponds to a low T 2 value and is therefore closer to 
the center of the data.
Any in-control instance can be considered an instance whose variables follow 
the dynamics of the system. These instances can be considered instances that would 
occur under normal operation. An out-of-control instance would be an instance whose 
dynamics do not fit uniformly in with the dynamics of the in-control instances. Out- 
of-control instances are not considered normal operation and therefore any operation 
that exists outside of normal operation can be classified as an out-of-control instance. 
The Hotelling’s T 2 value and the probabilistic metric aided in the classification of the 
instances into either an in-control set or an out-of-control set. An in-control instance 
would have a low T2 value and high probability of occurring. While an out-of-control 
instance would have a low probability and a high T2 value. Using this statistical metric 
classification of instances can be made such that instances that are not in-control are 
classified as a cyber-event.
Detection using the Hotelling’s T2 value is based on creating a quantile threshold. 
By transforming the trusted model into the new dimensional space where redundancy 
is reduced and plotting the Hotelling’s T2 value of each power system instance of the 
trusted model, a threshold value, Tfh, can be created. The new threshold value is
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determined by letting Tth = Qa = in f{q  : P[T2 < q] > a},  where a  is the probability. 
If for any newly observed power system instance that instance’s Hotelling’s T 2 value 
is found to be greater than Tt2 , then it can be classified as an out-of-control instance.
4.5 Localization
However, the challenge then comes to classify the node or source of the 
cyber-event. As the convergence feature is used to train discriminate classifiers 
and the dimensional transformation used for the instance classification, localization 
is a classification based on the statistics found within each variable independently. 
Localization is only performed once an event has been labeled as possibly containing 
a cyber-event. The flow algorithm depicting where localization is to occur in the 
detection scheme is shown in Figure 4.2.
4.5.1 Grubbs Test
The Grubbs test, also known as the maximum normed residual test, is used to 
detect outliers in a univariate dataset [77] [78]. Formally, the test can be defined as a 
means of hypothesis testing. By using the test statistic G as defined by
G =  m a x |n ~ f '1, (4.13)
s
the result of the hypothesis test can either be H0 for no outliers in the dataset 
and Ha if there is exactly one outlier in the dataset. W ith Yl representing the 
measured value, Y  representing the sample mean, and s representing the standard 
deviation of the state variable, it is also possible to define the critical region for 
each variable. W ith t a / ( 2 N ) , N - 2  denoting the critical value of the t distribution with
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(N-2) degrees of freedom and a significance level of a / 2 N  a formalization of the test 
hypothesis can be determined. The test hypothesis Ha is true if for a given dataset 
Y =  [2/1, 2/2, • • •, 2/tv-i, 2/̂ v],
is found to be true.
For clarity, the Grubbs test is syntactically adjusted to fit the application of 
detecting the compromised power system state variable. For an incoming power system 
instance Xi, the dimensional transformation scheme, PCA, transforms it into a new 
vector space and a distance classifier is used to determine the validity of the instance. 
However, this does not identify the variable that was the source of the cyber-event. 
Therefore, after each power system instance cyber-event classification, the Grubbs 
test can be performed on each variable independently to determine any potential 
anomalies in that state variable based on historical readings. Each newly observed 
instance i is comprised of n  variables with each variable labeled as x tJ . By letting 
Yj =  [xitj ,X2j ,  • • •, xjv- i j ,  xnj],  a new notation can be defined for the identification 
scheme. For instance, the vector Yx describes the full set of bus 1 voltages.
Since the newest power system instance is the one that has been identified as 
containing the cyber-event, the state variables of this N th observation will be the ones 
analyzed by the Grubbs test. The Grubbs test can now formally be defined as
(4.14)
c  V n j  -  Yt \ (4.15)
and
G > SafN- (4.16)
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In Eq. (4.16) a discriminate Sa<N is created that equals the right hand side of Eq.
(4.14). Localization via the Grubbs Test is based on performing Eq. (4.16) for each of 
the state variables found in the suspicious power system instance. If G is found to 
be higher than 5a^ , then that variable is flagged as being the potential source of the 
cyber-event.
4.6 Conclusions
Current solutions to detecting cyber-events in the power grid fundamentally 
lack a complete picture. Specifically, these more traditional approaches use a cyber 
perspective which fundamentally ignores the system’s physical perspective. This 
chapter outlined a knowledge discovery approach for the detection of cyber-events 
based on a physical perspective. The physical perspective is built based on a trusted 
model extracted from the historical SCADA databases of the power system under 
analysis. Two uniquely crafted classifiers, a convergence classifier and an instance 
classifier are used for the detection of cyber-events while a localization classifier is 
used to identify the source(s) of the event(s).
The first classifier, the convergence classifier, is based on discriminate analysis 
and is used to determine if a subset of the power system instance variables m ath­
ematically satisfy the power flow equations. Next, the instance is placed through 
the instance classifier where the power system instance is transformed via PCA to a 
new dimensional space for comparisons against the trusted mode. If either classifier 
identifies the presence of an event, localization begins and is based on the Grubbs Test 
performed for each state variable of the suspicious power system instance. Results of
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the cyber-event detection scheme outlined in this chapter are presented in Chapters 8 
and 9. Furthermore, Chapter 12 outlines some additions that may increase the overall 
accuracy of the physically derived cyber-event detection scheme.
C H A P T E R  5
S IM U L A T IO N  M O D E L S
5.1 Introduction
The knowledge discovery approach for the detection of state estimation attacks 
utilizes a set of models to simulate power system dynamics and to produce a set 
of possible state estimation attacks. The two power system models used for this 
examination are often found in the literature [2, 79, 80, 81, 82] and provides a set 
of possible topologies for the testing and development of power system control and 
security detection schemes. The attack models include the changing of an observed 
power system instance in a manner that targets one or multiple power system state 
variables. It is considered, as described in Section 5.4, that this change can take on 
many forms.
5.2 M odeling Power System s
The following two sections describe the two power system models utilized 
throughout this dissertation for the development and testing of the detection scheme. 
In an attem pt to mirror live power systems for the development process, simulations 
include such factors as line impedances along with shunt capacitance for transmission 
lines greater than 50 miles. This approach is often utilized in both academia and 
industry and is considered the standard approach for power flow studies [1].
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Furthermore, each system is examined in two different ways. The first is where 
only the following information is included: bus voltage amplitude, voltage angles, real 
and reactive powers generated, along with the real and reactive loads being consumed
real and reactive powers being injected into each bus via the transmission lines. An 
illustration of the injected powers is shown in Figure 5.1. The apparent power Sij  is 
made up of the real and reactive powers Pfj  and Qij,  respectively.
The term powers when stated throughout the remainder of this dissertation 
represents both the real and reactive components. The subscripts i and j  denote the 
bus numbers in sequence of the origin bus i and is directed at the destination bus j .  
Direction is maintained mathematically using negative sign notation. For instance, a 
value of —£2,1 would denote that power is entering bus two from bus 1. Lastly, because 
the line impedances are being considered throughout this analysis, S \ }2 7  ̂ — .52,1.
5.2.1 5-Bus
The first power system utilized for the development and testing of the detection 
scheme is a 5-bus 135 kV power system with a base power of 100 MVA. This system is 
provided in Stevenson et al. [2] as an example into approaches for power flow studies,




Figure 5.1: Power System Notation
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and for completeness, a one-line diagram and the corresponding system parameters 
are presented in Appendix A. System parameters include line impedances, and shunt 
capacitances. Also, provided in Appendix A is an example power flow simulation with 
inputs and outputs provided in Tables A.2 and A.3, respectfully.
5.2.2 IEEE 14-Bus
The second power system utilized is the IEEE 14-bus standard test case 
operating at 135 kV with a base power of 100 MVA. This particular system has been 
used extensively in the literature [79, 80, 81, 82] for the purpose of simulation and 
development of power control applications. The one-line diagram and corresponding 
system parameters for the IEEE 14-bus power system are shown in Appendix B. 
Similarly, system parameters include line impedances, and shunt capacitances. Also, 
examples of inputs and outputs of the IEEE 14-Bus for the power flow problem are 
provided in Tables B.2 and B.3.
5.3 M onte Carlo Sim ulations
In order to obtain a full set of power system attributes, several Monte Carlo 
Simulations were conducted using the 5-Bus [2] and IEEE 14-Bus [83] power systems 
described in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectfully. Monte Carlo power flow 
analysis is a well known method for probabilistic power flow studies [28] and can 
either have a deterministic set of inputs or a pseudorandom sample set of inputs. The 
probability density function of the uniform distribution utilized for the Monte Carlo 
simulations follows Eq. 5.1. The exact values of 6 and a include a = — 2 and 6 =  2,
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allowing for considerations twice that of the multiplied power system instance.
p(x) =  ^  (5.1)
Once a power system’s Monte Carlo simulation is completed, the results are collected 
into a data matrix X with X 5Btl,s and X i4b„., denoting the trusted model of the 5-Bus 
and IEEE 14-Bus power systems, respectively. Furthermore, in the general sense the 
data matrix X will be denoted as X.system-
Each newly constructed data matrix X system is a full set of empirical readings 
that may exist for that given power system topology. This simulated data is to serve 
as the readings reported to and found in a transmission level SCADA system. The 
resulting power flow analysis is used to create a trusted model and random instances 
are then selected to build simulated cyber-events to test the developed detection 
scheme. It should be noted that the power flow analysis in a live implementation of 
the developed detection will serve on in a complimentary manner. The primary source 
of information will be provided by the Historian server which records live actual power 
system state parameters that may deviate from a mathematical model. This and the 
exact suggested implementation and live testing of the developed detection scheme is 
discussed in Chapter 11.
5.4 C yber-E ven t A ttack  M odels
The cyber-event attack model used for the development and testing of the 
detection scheme presented in this dissertation is based on single variate and multi­
variate state estimation attacks. A state estimation attack is one where a reported 
state variable is maliciously recorded in the historical database of a SCADA system.
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The approach this dissertation develops is two-fold in that it represents two possibilities 
that can occur in a power system. Event #1 can be considered to be a non-malicious 
incident in which the controller or sensor in the field making the measurement breaks 
or becomes damaged as a result of natural causes. Some examples of this may include 
natural disasters, faulty equipment, or wear on the device over the years. Event # 2  
can be classified as an actual malicious event in which an attacker purposely launches 
an attack against the control system. Examples of this include the falsification or 
spoofing of data values reported from a smart meter as revealed by Brinkhaus et al. 
[26]. This work currently makes no distinction of the two events, only that it is able 
to determine that an event has occurred. Once detection has occurred, that instance 
then can be further investigated and the actual cause of the event can be determined.
Each type of event can produce a multitude of numerical values depending on 
the extent of the device failure or malicious attack. In order to encompass the full 
range of event possibilities, two sets of values are simulated. A type I event is one 
wherein a cyber-event causes the power system state variable to read, measure, or 
record a value of zero. The second cyber-event, a type II event, is one wherein the 
power system state variable is read, measured, or recorded as being a value other 
than zero. For a structured examination, the taxonomy of attacks considered in this 
examination are described in Table 5.1. Furthermore, each type of attack, either a 
type I or a type II, producing a cyber-event reading of x\ can target either a single (S) 
variable or target multiple (M) variables at once.
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Table 5.1: Attack Type Notation
Event Type
x' = 0 (I) x' ^ 0 (II)
Attack Type Single Variate (S) SI SIIMultivariate (M) MI Mil
5.4.1 Single Variate Attack of Type I
A single variate attack of type I is one wherein only a single variable is considered 
to be the source of a cyber event at a time. Also, this cyber event is one such that the 
resulting state variable that was attacked has a value of zero, x\ — 0. To simulate these 
types of events, a random instance from data matrix X  was selected. This random
  ̂ _—y
instance vector X r serves as the basis for the event simulation. The selection of X r 
of X is based on picking a random index i such that X r\r=, and {i e Z| < N }  where 
N xn  is the size of X. Next, an initialization vector for the power system, Sys tem , 
of all ones and of length n is created and serves as the bases for the simulation, 
ISystem =  [°i ’ ' '  an\ — [1 ’ ' • 1] • To determine which variable will simulate the attack, 
a random index I is selected such that {I e Z| < n}, where n is the size of vector 
jti and I  System- The element of I  system defined by random index I is now changed to 
zero, producing the initialized simulation attack vector Isystem[ai\ = Using this 
notation a type I single variate attack instance for the power system System  is created 
according to Eq. (5.2) and is based on the Hadamard product,
f ;  =  % °  (5 .2)
5.4.2 M ultivariate Attack of Type I
In a type I multivariate attack, two or more state variables of a power system
instance are considered to have changed to zero. To create the set of type I multivariate
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attack instances for the power system, System, a vector of ones is created, Isystem =  
[al5-- - , an] =  [l,-- - ,1]. Using the data matrix X/vxn f°r the power system in 
question, a random row, Jtr, is selected to form the attack instance. The row ) tr \r=, 
is determined such that {i e Z| < N},  where N is the total number of power system 
instances retained in the system’s trusted model. If the number of variables that will 
be attacked is represented by k and k =  2 , then two random random indices I and j  
are picked such that I ^  j  and {l , j  e Z\ < n}. These indices provide the index for 
which two variables will simulate the attack, specifically the elements I'system[ai] =  0 
and I ’systeJa j ] =  0. Using this notation Eq. (5.2) can be utilized for the multivariate 
attack of type I as long as the initialization vector I'system described in this subsection 
is used.
5.4.3 Single Variate Attack of Type II
In a similar manner, Equation (5.2) can be used to construct the single variate 
attack of type II, as long as the newly crafted initialization attack vector, I'systemi 
is crafted. To represent this type of attack instances for the power system, System , 
a vector of ones is created of size n, I  system — [gi, • • • , «n] =  [U • • • , 1]- Letting k 
represent the number of variables that will be attacked, k =  1 in the case of the single 
variate attack. For k = 1, a single random index I is picked such that {i e Z\ < n}. 
This index I represents the origin of the simulated attack. Using this notation, the 
element /s ystem[u;] =  U(0,1) where 17(0,1) is the uniform random distribution function 
with bounds between 0 and 1. Following Equation (5.2), the attack instance is 
created based on ^System•
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5.4.4 M ultivariate Attack o f T ype II
The same approach described in the previous subsections is also used to 
construct the multivariate attack of type II. In this case, two or more variables are 
changed to a number other than zero. If the number of variables that will be attacked 
is represented by k and k — 2 then two random random indices I and j  are picked 
such that I 7̂  j  and { l , j  e Z| < n}. Using the indices i and j ,  for when k = 2 the 
attack initialization vector becomes I'System[ai} — U{0,1) and l'Svstein[a,] =  t / (0 ,1), 
where 1/(0,1) is the uniform random distribution function between 0 and 1. Using 
this notation, a multivariate attack of type II for power system System  is created 
according to Eq. (5.2) with the only substitution being the initialization attack vector, 
I  System’ formulated in this subsection.
5.5 Conclusions
This chapter laid the foundation in the formalization of simulation models used 
to develop and test the cyber event detection scheme outlined in this dissertation. 
Multiple probabilistic Monte Carlo simulations were ran based on the Newton- 
Raphason method to construct near realistic power system instances. A total of 
two power system topologies are used, a 5-Bus and the IEEE 14-Bus power system. 
For each system, two separate considerations are made. The first consideration is that 
only the bus voltages, angles, and powers consumed and generated are known. The 
second consideration assumes a more complete observation of the power system in 





The following Sections describe the feature extraction results for the 5-Bus and 
the IEEE 14-Bus power systems. Instances were created for each system using the 
Monte Carlo simulations described in Section 5.3. Based on the simulations, several 
key features are extracted that describe power systems in general and that are unique 
to the individual system topologies. Features offer a perspective on normal operation 
and are used as classification metrics for the cyber-event detection scheme developed 
in this dissertation. The following list outlines were each extracted feature is used in
the developed detection scheme.
1 . Convergence Feature
The convergence feature is used in the 1st step of the detection scheme
called the convergence classifier.
2. Dimensional Transformation
Features based on the dimensional transformation are used in the instance
classifier.
3. Univariate Statistics
The localization stage uses univariate statistics to localize or determine the
source of the cyber-event.
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6 .2  C onvergence F ea tu re
Feature extraction of convergence information offers valuable insight into what 
the power system can and cannot handle. The set of state variables tha t produce 
a reasonable power system model collectively exist in what is called the feasible 
region [84], If the power flow analysis converges for a set of inputs, then those set 
of inputs (topological, load, and generation constraints) produces a feasible power 
system instance that could potentially be observed in a live power system. The 
convergence feature describes the extraction of information when looking at only a 
subset, specifically the subset C =  C\ ■ ■ ■ where {C 6  3^}. In order to be placed in 
the converging set, the input parameters had to solve the power flow problem in less 
than 26 iterations with a tolerance of 0 .01 .
Convergence is considered important as it provides an initial check for the 
potential presence of a cyber-event as outlined in Figure 4.2. It is also recognized 
that in some instances the Newton-Raphson method may fail to converge even for an 
instance contained inside the feasible region [84]. However, the region that contains 
the feasible non-converging instances is small as compared to the region of feasible 
converging instances as developed by the Monte Carlo simulations. It is noted in the 
the future work, Chapter 12, how the convergence classifier could possible be modified 
to account for the slightly larger feasible region.
6.2.1 5-Bus
The 5-Bus power system state variables analyzed for convergence analysis are 
shown in Table 6.1 along with the descriptions of each variable. These variables serve
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as the inputs to the power flow calculations and if converge represent possible power 
system state parameters. There are a total of 13 power system state variables that are 
used for inputs into the Newton-Raphson power flow problem. The voltage variables 
are considered voltage controlled buses as these values are inputs to the power flow 
problem. The voltage controlled parameters V\ and t>2 are mapped in Figure 6.1 and 
show the area of convergence for the 5-Bus test system. This figure represents a total 
of 1,000 simulated power flow inputs with 500 making up the converging set shown 
using a triangle marker and 500 making up the non-converging set shown using a 
circle marker. Over 95% of the converging inputs are contained within the middle 
ellipsoid shown in Figure 6.1.
T able 6.1: 5-Bus Convergence Parameters
Variable (s) D etails
Vi,V3 Bus 1 and 3 Voltage
PGs Bus 3 Real Power Generated
P L \ , P L 2 , PL 3 , P L 4 , P L 5 Bus i Real Power Load
Q L i , QL 2 1 QL3, QL^, QL§ Bus i Reactive Power Load
2 
1.5 
^  1 
0.5 
0
F ig u re  6.1: 5-Bus Convergence Map for Controlled Voltage Parameters
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Figure 6.1 is explained given the fact that the power flow solution only exists 
for a set region or area of convergence [84]. The information shown in this figure 
provides insight into the possibility of using a discriminate classifier given the distinct 
separation between the two converging and non-converging classes.
6.2.2 IEEE 14-Bus
Similar to the 5-Bus analysis approach, the 14-Bus power state variables 
analyzed for convergence analysis are shown in Table 6.2 along with the descriptions 
of each variable. These variables serve as the inputs to the power flow calculations, 
and if converge they also represent possible power system state parameters. As Table
6.2 shows, there are a total of 31 power system state variables that are used for inputs 
into the IEEE 14-Bus Newton-Raphson power flow problem. Unlike the 5-Bus system, 
the 14-Bus system has a total of 5 voltage control busses.
Table 6.2: 14-Bus Convergence Parameters
Variable(s) Details
Fl,F2,F3,F6,F8 Bus i Voltages
p g 2 Bus 2 Real Power Generated
QG$, QG6, QGg Bus i Reactive Power Generated
PL2 — PLq, PLg — P I /14 Bus i Real Power Load
QL2 — QLq, QLg — QLu Bus i Reactive Power Load
Figure 6.2 reveals an interesting trend showing a near linear convergence 
relationship between voltage controlled bus 1 and voltage controlled bus 2. For this 
reason, a convergence map showing the converging and non-converging regions is 
constructed that compares these two voltage controlled busses. These results indicate
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that for the IEEE 14-Bus system the existence of distinguishable features that can be 
used for discriminate classification of the two classes.
2
1.5 
^  1 
0.5 
0
Figure 6.2: 14-Bus Convergence Map for Controlled Voltages Bus 1 and 2
6.3 D im ensional Transformation
The feature extraction process described in the previous section is binary in 
nature and examines a multivariate dataset to train discriminate classifiers to predict 
convergence. One benefit of initially starting with the classification of convergence is it 
is a subset of the entire feature allowing for faster computation time. The convergence 
classifier examines reported power system state variables in its original coordinate 
system. However, by transforming the data in such a way that corresponds to the 
variances in the dataset, new information can be revealed and therefore new features 
extracted. The transformation utilized to transform each power system instance into 
a new dimensional space is called principal component analysis (PCA). The features 
extracted during this process are used in the instance classifier for the detection of 
cyber-events.
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The mathematical derivation and approach of applying PCA to power system 
state variables is described in Chapter 4, Section 4.4. This section summarizes the 
dimensional transformation results of the 5-Bus and IEEE 14-Bus power systems. For 
both topologies, the transformation is performed when line flows, injected powers, 
are not being considered, and when they are being considered. The exact state 
variables used for each case are described in next subsection. Afterwards, the results 
of the transformation for all four cases are summarized here while the raw results of 
transforming 500 power system instances are shown in Appendix C.
6.3.1 State Variables R etained for Transformation
Shown in Tables 6.3 through 6.6 are the state variables retained for analysis for 
the four cases considered. For the 5-Bus power system, two cases are considered with 
Table 6.3 listing the exact state variables used in the case of the first transformation. 
Here a total of 23 variables are retained for analysis. The second stage adds to this with 
the addition of the state variables listed in Table 6.4. Using the notation developed in 
Chapter 5 Section 5.2 the state variables listed in Table 6.4 show the injected powers 
of the 5-Bus power system. These additional features are added to the 23 stated in 
the previous case for a total of 47 state variables retained for analysis.
Table 6.3: 5-Bus State Parameters W ithout Line Flows
Variable(s) Details
Vi,V2)V3,V4,V5 Bus i Voltage
02, 03, 04, #5 Bus i Angles
p g u p g 3 Bus 1 and 3 Real Power Generated
QG\ , QG3 Bus 1 and 3 Reactive Power Generated
P L \,P L 2 , PL3, PLi,PL§ Bus % Real Power Load
QL\, QL2, Q f3, Q f4, Qfs Bus i Reactive Power Load
71
Table 6.4: 5-Bus Power Line Flow Variables
Line # B us i  to  B us j P1 1,3 Q<j P1 3,1 Q i,i
1 1 - 2 P l -2 Ql-2 P2-1 Q2-1
2 2 - 5 P2-5 Q2-5 P5-2 Q5-2
3 2 - 3 P2-3 Q2-3 P3-2 Q3-2
4 3 - 4 P3-4 Q3-4 P4-3 Q4-3
5 3 - 5 P3-5 Q3-5 P5-3 Q5-3
6 4 - 5 P4-5 Q4-5 P5-4 Q5-4
Tables 6.5 and 6.6 describe the state variables used for each of the two cases for 
the larger IEEE 14-Bus power system. For the case where the lines, injected power, are 
not being considered, there are a total of 52 variables, each of which are described in 
Table 6.5. This includes the voltages, angles, powers generated, and powers consumed 
at each bus. For the IEEE 14-Bus case where the power through the lines are being 
considered, a total of 134 state variables are retained for the transformation. The 
exact variables added to those shown in Table 6.5 are shown in Table 6 .6 . These 
variables adhere to the notation developed perviously in Chapter 5, Section 5.2.
Table 6.5: IEEE 14-Bus State Parameters W ithout Line Flows
Variable(s) Details
V i , . . . , V u Bus i Voltage
02, ■ - - ,014 Bus i Angles
PG i,PG 2 Bus 1 and 2 Real Power Generated
QG \ , QG2 Bus 1 and 2 Reactive Power Generated
QG3, QGe, QGg Bus 3, 6 and 9 Reactive Capacitance Supplied
PL2, • ■. ,  P L q, PLg,  . . .  , P L u Bus i Real Power Load
QL2,  • • • ,  QLe, Q9, ■ ■ ■, QLu Bus i Reactive Power Load
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Table 6.6: IEEE 14-Bus Power Line Flow Variables
Line # Bus i  to Bus j P1 1,3 P Qj.i
1 1 - 2 Pl-2 Ql-2 P2-1 Q2-1
2 1 - 5 Pl-5 Ql-5 P5-1 Q5-1
3 2 - 3 P2-3 Q2-3 P2-3 Q2-3
4 2 - 4 P2-4 Q2-4 P4-2 Q4-2
5 2 - 5 P2-5 Q2-5 P5-2 Q5-2
6 3 - 4 P3-4 Q3-4 P4-3 Q4-3
7 4 - 5 P4-5 Q4-5 P5-4 Q5-4
8 4 - 7 P4-7 Q4-7 P7-4 Q7-4
9 4 - 9 P4-9 Q4-9 P9-4 Q9-4
10 5 - 6 P5-6 Q5-6 P6-5 Q6-5
11 6 -  11 P6-11 Q6-11 P ll-6 Q ll-6
12 6 -  12 P6-12 Q6-12 P I 2-6 Q12-6
13 6 -  13 P6-13 Q6-13 P I 3-6 Q13-6
14 7 - 8 P7-8 Q7-8 P8-7 Q8-7
15 7 - 9 P7-9 Q7-9 P9-7 Q9-7
16 9 -  10 P9-10 Q9-10 PI 0-9 Q10-9
17 9 -  14 P9-14 Q9-14 PI 4-9 Q14-9
18 10 - 11 P10-11 Q10-11 P ll-10 Q ll-10
19 12- 13 P12-13 Q12-13 P13-12 Q13-12
20 13- 14 P13-14 Q13-14 P14-13 Q14-13
6.3.2 Transformation Results
Using the state variables described in the previous subsection, PCA was used to 
transform each power system instance into the new dimensional space. The information 
extracted in this new dimensional space is used by the instance classifier to detect 
the presence of a cyber-event. For each of the four cases considered, there is a 
m Xn  data matrix X 5?/Stem that is transformed to the new dimensional space. The 
number of rows m  of X.system denotes the number of power system instances retained 
for transformation, while the number of columns n denotes the number of features 
retained. For each of the four cases considered, the size of XLsystem is stated in Table 6.7.
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Furthermore, each column of Xsystem is assigned sequential to the features presented 
in the Tables described in the previous section.
Table 6.7: Data Matrix Sizes for Each of the Four Considered Cases
Case m n
5-Bus Without Injected Powers 500 23
5-Bus With Injected Powers 500 47
14-Bus Without Injected Powers 500 52
14-Bus With Injected Powers 500 134
As stated in Chapter 4, Section 4.4.1, the transformation offered by PCA is 
defined by the variances in the original dataset 'X.system■ The variances are used to 
construct each principal component with the first accounting for most of the variance 
in the data matrix ~Ksystem• Figure 6.3 provides an example of this in the form of a 
scree plot where the variances accounted for by the first ten principal components 
are listed. This figure displays the transformation results for the 5-Bus power system 
when the injected powers or lines are being considered. As shown in the figure, the 
first principal component accounted for 35% of the variance with all ten accounting 
for over 90% of the variance. For completeness, the scree plots for each consideration 
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A summary of the percent variances accounted for by the first 10 principal 
components for each of the considerations is shown below in Figure 6.4. This figure 
reveals that the ability to preserve the variances in the first 10 components decrease 
when changing from a small topology, 5-Bus, to a larger topology, the IEEE 14-Bus. 
However, this may not be universally true. Such an analysis is currently out of the 
scope of the dissertation. Furthermore, for both system topologies the percent variance 
accounted for by the first 10 components increases when the injected powers (with) 
are included. For example, for the 14-Bus system the variance accounted for jumps 
from 66.4% to 81.5% when lines are considered. This may be contributed to the 
fact that the larger the system the more information is required for the extraction of 
correlations.
Without With
IB 5-Bus 10 IEEE 14-Bus
F ig u re  6.4: Percent Variances Accounted for by the First 10 Components of Each 
Transformation
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W ith the state variable defined for each of the four cases, the power system 
instances can be mapped to the new dimensional space accordingly. The training 
models used for the development of the detection scheme are based on the power 
system state variables listed. By transforming them into a new dimensional space 
where redundancy is reduced, comparisons can be made offering substantial insight 
into normal operation of the power system topology under analysis. An example of 
the transformation is shown in Figure 6.5 where each power system instance is plotted 
as a single point according to the first two principal components for the 5-Bus power 
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Figure 6.5: Scores and Feature Vectors Transformed 5-Bus W ithout Line Flows
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Figure 6.5 represents 500 transformed power system instances for the 5-Bus 
system when the lines are not taken into consideration. As shown in the Figure 
6.5, the 23 variables explained in Table 6.3 are mapped to the new space as vector 
projections forming individual vectors for each column in data m atrix X 5Bus- By 
close examination of the vector projections, Figure 6.5 reveals that the voltage angles 
contribute mostly to the first component while four of the five bus voltage magnitudes 
contribute mostly to the second component. Interestingly, the voltage magnitude at 
the slack bus, bus 1, contributes more to the first component then compared to its 
contribution to the second component. The plotted transformation results for each 
consideration are shown in Figures C.2, C.6, C.10, and C.14 in Appendix C.
H otelling T 2 R esults
Continuing with using the 5-Bus power system as an example for this discussion, 
Figures 6.6 and 6.7, reveals the multivariate distance of each power system instance 
plotted in Figure 6.5. The first Figure shows the Hotelling’s T 2 value for each of the 
500 power system instances. This distance describes the distance to the origin or 
center cluster of the points in the new space. The greater this distance, the less the 
power system instance conforms to the patterns found in X 5bus. For this case, it was 
found that m ax(T2) =  107 while the mean T 2 =  107. The second figure, Figure 6.7, 
shows a Rayleigh distribution fitted to the Hotelling’s T2 values of the example case. 
This figure shows a statistical distribution of the values with 99% of the power system 
instances occurring below T 2 =  80.
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F igu re  6.6: Hotelling T2 of 500 5-Bus Instances Without Line Flows
T2 Value
Figure 6.7: Histogram and Rayleigh Curve Fit of T 2 values for 500 5-Bus Instances 
Without Line Flows
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The two plots described here were also created for each of the considered cases. 
Figures C.3, C.7 , C .ll ,  and C.15 show the exact Hotelling’s T 2 values while the 
histogram and fitted Rayleigh distributions are shown in Figures C.4, C.16, C.12, and 
C.16. For a comparative analysis, Table 6.8 summarizes the results shown in these 
figures. Based on the results presented in Table 6.8, the statistics of the Hotelling’s T2 
values increase as the number of features are retained across each of the two considered 
power system topologies.
Table 6.8: Hotelling T2 Statistics for Each of the Four Considered Cases
Case M ax(T2) M ean {i
5-Bus Without Injected Powers 109.7 22.5
5-Bus With Injected Powers 205.7 46.9
14-Bus Without Injected Powers 310.7 54.9
14-Bus With Injected Powers 395.5 137.4
The transformation features extracted, specifically the Hotelling’s T 2 values 
allow for the development of a trusted model for each of the four considerations. 
These values then can be compared to newly observed power system instances for 
the classification into either a normal or suspect set. Furthermore, outliers in the 
trusted model were removed by calculating the T2 value of each instance. An outlier 
is considered to exists if its value is more than three standard deviations away from 
the mean [85]. Outliers are removed in all four considerations of the two power system 
topologies. This is made possible given that extreme state parameter values in a live 
power system are prevented provided an adequate power system protection scheme. 
The resulting data matrix X  is what is used as the trusted model for the remainder 
of the analysis. The exact Hotelling’s T2 threshold values are described in Chapter 7.
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6.4 Univariate Statistics
Used for localization, the univariate statistics offers an understanding on the 
range of possible values for each power system state variable. This information is used 
to perform the Grubs’ test to find the variable or variables that are compromised. 
Potential features are extracted from this information and are in the context of the 
Grubs’ test formulated for this application in Section 4.5.1. In order to use the Grubbs 
test for localization, the sample mean Y  had to be predetermined. By examining the 
change in Y  over the change in training set size n, the preferred training set size 
was also determined. The size n was used when ^  ~  0. The training size n for all 
state variables for each topology, the 5-Bus and IEEE 14-Bus, had to be calculated. 
The results of this are provided in the following two sections.
6.4.1 5-Bus
Instead of providing plots for Y  for each variable of the 5-Bus system, only 
the voltage plots are provided in Figure 6.8. A summary of the determined sample 
size n  where ^  ps 0 for each of the 5-Bus state variables are provided in Table 6.9. 
For the purpose of coding, a stopping point of 0.00001 was used to determine the 
Yi and n. These results provide the numerical value that is used in the Grubbs Test 
to localize the source of the cyber-event. By examining Figure 6.8, it was determined 
that the voltage averages appear to stabilize for values after n = 200 with only slight 
differences found. Similar observations for the other state variables were found to 
exist. Table 6.9 shows that for the 5-Bus case all averages were found to level off by 
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Figure 6.8: 5-Bus Average Voltages for Grubbs Test ’n’ Selection
Table 6.9: 5-Bus Grubbs Test Parameters
Variable n M ean Y Variable n Mean Y
1 293 1.051 25 434 -0.8570
2 208 1.134 26 220 0.71863
3 470 1.311 27 593 0.58711
4 385 1.130 28 666 -0.4464
5 202 1.113 29 303 -0.3921
6 57 -0.1285 30 440 -0.2466
7 46 -0.0912 31 83 0.40346
8 213 -0.1928 32 357 0.26391
9 53 -0.1207 33 164 0.88382
10 390 2.419 34 478 0.36981
11 366 2.034 35 250 -0.2199
12 1188 -0.5759 36 681 1.035
13 1429 4.739 37 377 0.8812
14 468 0.6291 38 230 -0.3243
15 377 1.073 39 850 2.174
16 201 0.6378 40 222 -1.4210
17 363 0.6353 41 227 -0.4612
18 781 0.8223 42 377 -0.9921
19 386 0.2961 43 289 0.6351
20 141 0.6319 44 265 -0.1836
21 188 0.4021 45 919 -0.3916
22 246 0.2937 46 273 1.397
23 97 0.4079 47 359 0.2902
24 410 -0.6228
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6.4.2 IE E E  14-Bus
Similar to the 5-Bus ease, instead of providing plots for Y  for each variable 
of the IEEE 14-Bus power system, only the voltage plots are provided in Figure 6.9. 
Also, a summary of the determined sample sizes n are provided in Tables 6.10 and 
6.11. A stopping point of 0.00001 was also used to determine the Y  and n. It was 
determined that the voltage averages appear to stabilize for values after n = 150 with 
only slight diviations found. All of the state variables analyzed were found to level off 
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Figure 6.9: IEEE 14-Bus Average Voltages for Grubbs Test V  Selection
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Table 6.10: IEEE 14-Bus Grubbs Test Parameters for Variables 1-68
Variable n M ean Y Variables n M ean Y
1 239 1.128 35 162 0.23
2 232 1.3993 36 200 0.8606
3 560 1.0647 37 106 0.4952
4 299 1.2099 38 164 0.0721
5 263 1.2294 39 135 0.1093
6 194 1.2891 40 240 0.2861
7 572 1.1604 41 69 0.0893
8 308 1.1118 42 61 0.0361
9 614 1.174 43 86 0.0601
10 384 1.1802 44 274 0.1400
11 187 1.235 45 175 0.1433
12 470 1.2478 46 128 0.1337
13 176 1.2586 47 224 0.1897
14 109 1.2068 48 46 -0.037
15 229 -0.182 49 35 0.0139
16 208 -0.312 50 78 0.0737
17 98 -0.258 51 219 0.1662
18 213 -0.246 52 56 0.0555
19 154 -0.353 53 31 0.0171
20 125 -0.318 54 60 0.0169
21 125 -0.318 55 104 0.0584
22 327 -0.342 56 134 0.0471
23 304 -0.352 57 398 -1.572
24 100 -0.347 58 247 -0.950
25 79 -0.358 59 878 2.5586
26 344 -0.368 60 524 -0.697
27 340 -0.428 61 369 -0.807
28 577 3.5907 62 245 -0.630
29 76 1.7773 63 342 1.3644
30 1334 -5.916 64 466 0.6552
31 1384 14.368 65 339 1.0128
32 174 0.2563 66 227 -0.181
33 16 0.0126 67 246 0.8723
34 96 0.0192 68 287 -0.300
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Table 6.11: IEEE 14-Bus Grubbs Test Parameters for Variables 69-136
Variable n M ean Y Variable n M ean Y
69 265 -0.164 103 1033 2.9684
70 89 1.0412 104 767 0.7958
71 214 0.7876 105 537 1.6455
72 279 -0.813 106 1284 0.4551
73 283 -0.618 107 104 0.2756
74 283 0.6184 108 716 -0.026
75 148 -0.133 109 178 -0.001
76 60 -0.104 110 161 -0.371
77 177 -0.232 111 229 1.6143
78 287 0.3003 112 354 -0.194
79 2 -1.283 113 492 0.9477
80 287 -0.300 114 1372 -0.136
81 2 1.5266 115 730 -0.427
82 265 0.1648 116 252 -0.086
83 287 0.3004 117 139 -0.346
84 364 -0.055 118 585 0.3748
85 212 -0.067 119 611 0.8482
86 82 0.0747 120 345 0.1097
87 315 0.0762 121 480 -0.055
88 401 0.1701 122 66 0.0939
89 302 -0.028 123 817 -0.018
90 81 0.1088 124 112 0.3009
91 89 -0.041 125 325 0.1517
92 152 0.2524 126 254 -0.184
93 89 0.0444 127 757 0.4157
94 302 -0.071 128 458 0.5109
95 261 0.1025 129 742 -0.302
96 292 0.1162 130 345 0.0874
97 2174 8.3377 131 132 -0.077
98 255 0.9015 132 283 0.3257
99 276 -5.458 133 132 0.0804
100 564 -0.101 134 163 -0.245
101 1011 -1.035 135 699 -0.113
102 245 -1.124 136 319 0.2941
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6.5 Conclusions
This chapter outlined the several feature extraction methods that are utilized in 
the cyber-event detection scheme developed and tested by this dissertation. Features 
extracted included convergence, dimensional transformation, and univariate statistics. 
By first performing the feature extraction approaches outlined in this chapter, it 
was realized that a detection framework could be created that looked at the date in 
a reduced and concise manner. The feature extraction techniques were performed 
for both power system topologies, and for the instance classifier ad analysis on the 
two different conditions was also performed. This included transforming each power 
system’s data matrix into the new space when the injected powers are and are not 
being considered. The last feature retained for analysis was the univariate statistics 
of each state parameters for each power system topology. This information is retained 
for the purpose of localizing the source of the cyber-event via the Grubbs Test.
C H A P T E R  7
S E L E C T IO N  O F  C L A S S IF IE R  P A R A M E T E R S
7.1 Introduction
In an effort to develop an efficient detection scheme with high true positive 
rates and low false negative rates, certain classifier parameters had to be selected. 
This chapter describes the analysis and selection of these parameters for both the 
convergence and instance classifier. Parameters selected includes the sampling training 
size n  and other various statistical parameters. Recall that according to Chapter 4, 
the objective of the convergence classifier is to place a subset of the power system 
variables on to one of two classes. The first class is the converging or non-malicious 
set and the second class is the non-converging or malicious class. For the convergence 
classifier, variations include: training size n  and type of discriminant classifier.
The second classifier, the instance classifier, collectively examines all the 
variables of a power system instance. These power system instances are then 
transformed to a new dimensional space where a multivariate distance, the Hotelling’s 
T 2 value, is calculated for each one. Based on these values, it can be determined if a 





Using a subset, of state variables, the convergence classifier seeks to
determine whether or not a set of power system state variable will converge to a 
feasible set of power flow values. Recall as described in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1, a total 
of four discriminant analysis classifiers are considered as possible classifiers. These 
four include linear, diagonal linear, quadratic, and diagonal quadratic. Evaluation 
of these four discriminant analysis classifiers is based on varying the training size n 
along with setting a probability of 0.5 for each converging and non-converging training 
sets since that there are only two sets. Furthermore, to increase the robustness of the 
selection criterion a k-fold cross validation of k — 10 is used for each training size n. 
7.2.1 5-Bus
Using the notation developed earlier in Chapter 4, the power system instance 
input subset for the 5-Bus power system contained a total of 13 power system
state variables, s i z e [ X ^ ^ ts] — 13. Figures 7.1 and 7.2 outline the results of analyzing 
the varying training size n for the four discriminant classifiers. As shown in Figure 7.1, 
the quadratic classifier outperformed the three others with a true positive classification 
rate on average of 91% for various sizes n. The misclassified data shown in Figure 7.2 
accounts for the sum of the false negative and false positive results combined. The 
objective of this particular analysis is to determine for what value n  produced the 
lowest misclassification rate. As shown in the figure, the lowest for all three classifiers 
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Keeping to the notation, the instance input subset for the IEEE 14-
Bus power system contained a total of 31 power system state variables, s i z e [ X f ^ ts(i)} = 
31. Using the same analysis process used to determined parameters for the 5-Bus 
system, the results of the 14-Bus system are show in Figures 7.3 and 7.4. Results 
are quite similar and as revealed in Figure 7.3, the discriminate classifier that out­
performed the others was the quadratic classifier. True positive classification for the 
quadratic classifier averaged at 85% for varying size n.
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Figure 7.4: IEEE 14-Bus Convergence Discriminant Classifier Misclassification Rate
For the misclassification of data, it appears that by examining Figure 7.4 there 
is a steady decrease as an increase of n is made. Therefore, for any selected size above 
n = 3000 not much difference will be observed for the misclassification rate.
7.2.3 Classifier Parameters Selected
Based on the analysis performed in the previous subsection, the parameters 
summarized in Table 7.1 reveal the parameters selected for the convergence classifier. 
These parameters are used in the convergence stage classifier of the developed detection 
scheme whose results are shown in Chapter 8. Furthermore, it is mentioned in the 
future work, Chapter 12, that modifications of these parameters may lead to higher
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true positive and lower false positive classification results. In order to assess the 
scalability of the developed cyber-event detection approach, it is desired to keep the 
parameters for the two power system topologies as close together as possible. The 
results performed in this section reveal that this is indeed possible.
Table 7.1: Selected Convergence Classifier Parameters for Each Topology
System Classifier Type Training Size n
5-Bus Quadratic 3,000
IEEE 14-Bus Quadratic 3,000
7.3 Instance Classifier
The instance classifier is based on the transformation given by PCA into a new 
dimensional space. Recall that each power system instance once in this new space has 
an associated multivariate distance, Hotelling’s T2 value, to the origin. This distance 
is what the instance base classifier uses to determine if a cyber-event exists in a new 
observation of the power system under analysis. This section uses the transformation 
results of Section 6.3.2 to determine the threshold values for each of the power system 
cases under consideration. Recall that a total of four cases are considered, two for 
each system topology. For each topology, the two cases included when the injected are 
being considered and when they are not being considered. The resulting T2 threshold 
values for each consideration are shown in Table 7.2 and are based on the 90% quintile 
of the trusted models’ Hotelling’s T2 values.
As shown in Table 7.2, results indicate that the threshold distances increase 
when more variables are added for a given system topology. Using the 5-Bus power
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system as an example, the consideration without injected powers has a T^hr =  37.2, 
and when injected powers are considered, the threshold value more than doubles 
to T |hr =  86.2. These observations correspond to the fact that more variables are 
contributing to the principal components in the new dimensional space. For each case 
considered, these values list the value utilized for instance based classification. If a 
newly observed power system instance is plotted in the new space and is found to 
have a Hotelling’s T 2 value greater than the threshold values, T2 > T^hr, then that 
instance is considered to contain a cyber-event. The results of the instance classifier 
using these threshold values are presented in Chapter 8.
Table 7.2: Selected Instance Classifier Hotelling T2
System
Topology
H oteling T2 
Threshold Value T£hre
5-Bus Without Injected Powers 37.2
5-Bus With Injected Powers 86.2
14-Bus Without Injected Powers 84.9
14-Bus With Injected Powers 229
7.4 Conclusions
This chapter outlined the steps and values taken to determine the parameters for 
both the convergence and instance classifiers. Based on the convergence classification 
results, the classifier that has the highest success is the quadratic discriminant classifier. 
The quadratic classifier produced an average true positive rate of 92% for the 5-Bus 
system and 85% for the 14-Bus system with a training size n > 1000. The parameter 




W ith classifiers and respected parameters selected, full simulation of the 
detection framework described in Chapter 4 can be performed. This chapter analyzes 
the results of the cyber-event identification. Recall that according to the approach, 
Figure 4.2, cyber-event identification can occur at either the convergence stage classifier 
or the instance stage classifier. Both identification classifiers are designed to identify the 
presence of a cyber-event at which point localization is then performed. Localization is 
considered the identification of the the origin of the cyber-event and can only take place 
once a power system instance has been identified as containing a cyber-event. The 
localization results for the cyber-events identified here in this chapter are presented in 
Chapter 9. The relationship between the classifiers and the localization stage of the 
detection framework is presented in Figure 8.1. If the convergence classifier is not able 
to detect the presence of a cyber-event, the observed state variables are passed to the 
instance classifier where a more extensive analysis is performed via the dimensional 
transformation. Only upon event identification is localization performed.
92
93







Figure 8.1: Cyber-Event Identification Approach
For each power system topology, a total of ten sets of analysis are performed 
and include the simulation of the different attacks under different conditions. Recall 
that the details of the simulated attack types are described in Chapter 5, Section 5.4, 
and that each are formed from a randomly selected trusted power system instance. 
The two main simulation categories shown above include the system when the injected 
powers are and are not being considered. As discussed in Chapter 5, injected powers 
describe the real and reactive powers traveling through the transmission lines. The 
ten sets utilized for each power system topology include:
1. The Power System Without Line Flows
(a) Single variate Type I Attack (SI)
(b) Single variate Type II Attack (SII)
(c) Multivariate Type I Attack (MI)
(d) Multivariate Type II Attack (Mil)
(e) False Positive Analysis
2. The Power System With Line Flows
(a) Single variate Type I Attack (SI)
(b) Single variate Type II Attack (SII)
(c) Multivariate Type I Attack (MI)
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(d) Multivariate Type II Attack (Mil)
(e) False Positive Analysis.
The raw identification results of the two classifiers are shown in Appendix D 
and are presented here in a consolidated manner in order to make direct comparisons 
across each simulated condition. These consolidated results include the false positive 
and true positive cyber-event classification of power system instances for the 5-Bus 
and IEEE 14-Bus power systems. An example of the raw identification results is 
presented in Figure 8.2 and Table 8.1. These results are for the 5-Bus power system 
when the injected powers or lines are not being considered.
Figure 8.2 shows the classification results for each power system state variable. 
In this figure, the total number of attacks simulated are provided by the ” cyber-event 
count” curve. These results indicate that the instance based or PCA classifier returned 
the highest true positive classification counts. Furthermore, upon close inspection of 
Figure 8.2, it is revealed that every attack performed on the two voltage controlled 
buses where detected by the convergence classifier. In addition to the T P  results 
presented for each consideration, a false positive (FP) analysis is performed with the 
results presented in the next Section. The benefit of such an exhaustive analysis 
permits the determination of the required conditions that lead to the most optimal 
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Figure 8.2: 5-Bus Without Line Flows SI Classification Results
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8.2 False Positive Analysis
The false positive results for the two classifiers are presented in Figure 8.3 and 
were performed by selecting random instances from the trusted models and placing
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them through the developed detection scheme. The selection of a random instance 
from the trusted model provides a form of cross validation and determines how the 
developed cyber-event detection scheme performs when no event is present. This 
process was performed for both power systems and for each case where line flows are 
included and where line flows are not included. Therefore, a total of eight bar graphs 
are shown in the figure. This information is also presented in Table 8.2 and includes 
the percent that returned false positive. A total of 20,000 power system instances 
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F igu re  8.3: False Positive Classification
IB 5-Bus §3 IEEE 14-Bus
A Convergence Without 
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Convergence X 1205 6.03 0 0
Convergence X 1226 6.13 0 0
Instance X 0 0 1961 9.81
Instance X 1229 5.65 1849 9.25
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The results indicated by Figure 8.3 and Table 8.2 show that the False Positive 
rate for increases for the instance based classifier when an increase in the size of 
the topology is made. This perhaps is in part due to the number of contributing 
projections provided by the covariance matrix of PCA. An increase in the number 
of features transformed by PCA lessens the contribution of that feature to the new 
dimensional space. Therefore, state variable attacks th a t slightly deviate about the 
trusted mean are less likely to be detected for bigger systems.
Chapter 12, Section 12.2.2 proposes a few modifications that may make it 
possible to lower this FP rate when an increase in size is made for a given system 
topology. Another interesting and less understood observation is the exact cause of 
the zero FP count for the convergence classifier for the 14-Bus system. Combining all 
the results, the developed cyber-event detection scheme falsely identified 4.67% of the
160,000 trusted power system instances tested. Furthermore, it is suspected that with 
the additions and parameter adjustments proposed in Chapter 12, this number could 
be decreased to about 1%, if not lower. Parameters adjustments may include varying 
the parameters outlined in Chapter 7 for each system consideration.
8.3 5-Bus Identification
This section outlines the results of the developed cyber-event detection when 
tested using the 5-Bus power system. Results described include the overall true 
positive (TP) classification along with detailed examinations into the performance of 
the convergence and instance classification stages. Raw results of the detection scheme 
for the 5-Bus power system are presented in Appendix D, Section D.l. Furthermore,
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a false negative (FN) analysis was performed in a manner similar to the TP analysis. 
These results are included in the last subsection of this section and offer a great deal 
of insight into what types of events and conditions the developed detection scheme 
failed to successfully classify a cyber-event.
8.3.1 T ru e  P o sitiv e  A nalysis
For the five bus system, the true positive count is the total number of times 
that a cyber-event was successfully recognized. Successful classification can occur at 
either the convergence stage or the instance stage. The results of the true positive 
classification are presented in Section D.l and include the cases where injected powers 
are and are not being considered. By combining the results, the developed detection 
scheme successfully identified a total of 163,511 out of the 175,000 simulated malicious 
power system instances. This corresponds to an overall true positive classification of 
93.4% for the 5-Bus power system. These results are broken down for each attack and 
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Convergence X 12,450 55,000 22.6
Convergence X 15,546 120,000 13.0
Instance X 38,069 55,000 69.2
Instance X 97,446 120,000 81.2
While the developed detection scheme was able to identify in all cases over 
85% of the simulated events, evidence would suggest a preference for the condition 
where the injected powers are not taken into consideration. As shown in Figure 8.4, 
for three out of the four attack types, true positive classification was higher in the 
case where the powers were not taken into consideration. For the Mil attack, the case 
where the injected powers are considered, resulted in a higher TP rate than the case 
without. Recall that this attack was constructed by changing two power system state 
variables to a value other than zero. For the Mil attack type, the case where powers 
are being considered the scheme successfully classified 96.3% while the case without 
classified only 86.9%. Similarly, results are also observed in trying to access which 
classifier functions best under which conditions. These results are shown in Table 8.3.
The results presented in Table 8.3 show that with including the injected powers 
the instance stage classifier successfully classified a higher percentage of the simulated 
cyber-events. A total of 81.2% were successfully identified while for the case without 
the power injected the instance classifier successfully classified only 69.2% of the 
instances. It is expected that this is the result that the injected powers offer more 
correlated features for the detection of the inconsistencies brought forth by the state
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variable attacks. These and other observations of the results of the two classifiers are 
discussed in the following two subsections. Recall that if the convergence classifier 
does not classify the cyber-event the power system state variables are then analyzed 
via the instance classifier. This means that for the case where the lines are being 
considered, 13% of the simulated events were detected by the convergence classifier 
while 81.2% were classified using the instance classifier for a total TP classification 
of 94.2%. Therefore, it should be noted as shown in Table 8.3 that low convergence 
TP  percentages does not necessarily mean low TP percentages for the developed 
cyber-event detection framework.
8.3.2 C onvergence C lassification
This subsection discusses the results of the convergence classifier for the 5-Bus 
system looking at specifically which state variables had the most success when it 
comes to true positive classification. Only a subset of the total power system state 
variables are considered at this stage of the detection scheme and therefore only those 
state variables will be analyzed. For the 5-Bus power system there are a total of 13 
state variables that are used by the convergence classifier. These are stated in Chapter 
6, Section 6.2.1 and include a subset of the system voltages, powers generated, and 
powers consumed. The overall TP count for the convergence classifier for each type of 
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F igu re  8.5: 5-Bus Overall True Positive Convergence Classifier Results
As shown in Figure 8.5, there are several dips in the classification count of the 
convergence classifier. These dips appear to occur at the convergence state variables c4, 
the real power being consumed at Bus 1, and cn, the reactive power being consumed at 
Bus 3. Furthermore, these dips are more pronounced for the type II events. As stated 
in Section 5.4, a type II event is one where the state variable is changed to a value other 
than zero. The increase in count value of the single variate (S) to multivariate (M) 
makes sense as there are more attacks occurring. Interestingly, however, the pattern 
of the results is maintained when going from the S attack count to the M attack count. 
These results indicate cyber-event occurring at convergence state variables Ci and Cn,
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and all four attack types have a low probability of being detected by the developed 
detection scheme.
For the attack type I there is a steady decrease in the TP count from c\ to c4, 
and remains steady though c13. Converging state variables c4 and c13 correspond to 
the real and reactive loads at each of the five buses. These low counts for these values 
correspond to the fact that the per unit values of the loads are approximately zero, 
making it harder to distinguish these types of attacks.
8.3.3 Instance Classification
Instance classification describes the classification based on the PCA transfor­
mation described in Chapter 4, Section 4.2. The instance classifier transforms the 
power system into a new dimensionally space where redundancy is reduced at which 
point the classifier then classifies according to a trusted model. The TP percentage 
for each of the four attack types are presented in Figure 8.6. For comparison, the two 
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Figure 8.6: 5-Bus Overall True Positive Instance Classifier Results
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Examination of Figure 8.6, reveals that for the instance classifier, the retention 
of the injected powers in the calculation produces higher TP classification. A trend is 
also noted that as the attack types become more sophisticated, the TP percentage also 
decreases. This is more profound for the case where the injected powers are not taken 
into consideration. For this case, for the M il attack, the TP percentage drops below 
half as compared to the SI attack. The decreasing trend is believed to be related to 
the fact that more instances are being flagged as suspect by the convergence classifier. 
This would cause the instance classifier to decrease in its classification as compared to 
the overall count of the total number of simulated power system instances.
Another analysis approach is to plot the instance detection against all state 
variables of the 5-Bus power system. This is shown in Figures 8.7 and 8.8, revealing 
which attacks on which variables have the highest likelihood of being detected by the 
instance classifier. The case where the injected powers are not being considered are 
presented in Figure 8.7, while the results for the case where they are being considered 
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F ig u re  8.8: 5-Bus Overall True Positive Instance Classifier Results, W ith Injected 
Powers
Interestingly, for both topological considerations, the MI attack type has the 
highest instance based classification. Furthermore, upon inspection of Figure 8 .8 , it is 
revealed that the TP count remains relatively constant for state variables £24 — X37. 
These variables correspond to the injected powers in each bus and are described in 
Table 6 .6 . Furthermore, the figures reveal that on average the attack type SI was the 
hardest to identify by the instance classifier. Lastly there are noticeable dips in the 
TP counts for attack types SII and MIL Both are attacks where the values are altered 
to a value other than zero.
8.3.4 False N egative Analysis
The false negative (FN) analysis describes the events that were falsely classified 
as having no cyber-event. This was performed in a similar manner to the true positive 
analysis. For a power system instance to be placed in the non cyber-event class, it has
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to be classified as such by both classifiers. Once the convergence classifier determines 
no cyber-event is present, the instance base classifier then proceeds to detect for the 
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F ig u re  8.9: 5-Bus Overall False Negative Instance Classifier Results
The results shown in Figure 8.9 reveal that zero FN instances occurred for 
the case without injected powers while the case with never reached above 3% FN. 
Also, it is revealed that by increasing the complexity of the attack, this decreased the 
FN count down to zero for the most sophisticated attack simulated, the M il attack. 
It is also interesting to note which power system state variables when compromised 
produced the FN results. Given that the FN results indicate which variables are not 
detectable using the developed detection a much more extensive analysis of these 
results are presented in Chapter 10 Section 10.2.
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8.4 IEEE 14-Bus Identification
Similar to the 5-Bus topology, two instances of the 14-Bus power system are 
considered for the developed detection scheme. The first is when the injected powers 
in the transmission lines are not being considered and the other case is when they 
are being considered. In both considerations, a total of four different attack types are 
considered along with a false positive (TP) and false negative (FN) analysis. Raw 
results of the convergence and instance classifiers for the IEEE 14-Bus power system 
are presented in Appendix D, Section D.2.
8.4.1 True Positive Analysis
The true positive classification results for the IEEE 14-Bus power system are 
presented in Section D.2 with the results summarized in Table 8.4 and Figure 8.10. 
Recall that successful classification or identification of the cyber-events can occur at 
either the convergence or instance classifiers. Combining the results across all eight 
considerations the developed cyber-event detection scheme accurately identified a total 
of 146,392 of the 160,000 simulated cyber events. This corresponds to a true positive 
classification rate of 91.5% for the 14-Bus system.
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Convergence X 4,769 80,000 5.96
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F ig u re  8.10: IEEE 14-Bus Overall True Positive Results for Each Attack Type
The lowest true positive classification occurred for the SI attack type when the 
injected powers are not being considered. Recall a SI attack type is one wherein the 
state variable is changed to zero. The TP classification of the SI attack type was 60% 
for the case without the injected powers while the TP rate when the injected powers 
are included was 95.5%. Furthermore, for all attack types the TP results increased 
when the injected powers are being considered. This is perhaps due to the fact that 
PCA has more correlated variables allowing for the detection of anomalies in the data.
To better understand the results in Figure 8.10, the TP results for each 
classifier under each consideration are presented in Table 8.4. The lowest TP  count
Attack Type
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was by the convergence classifier when the injected powers are considered. For this 
consideration, the convergence classifier was only able to determine 5.96% of the 
cyber-events simulated. One reason this could be so low is that most of the cyber­
events simulated did not occur on the input subset, X 1̂ ^ ,  making it impossible for 
the convergence classifier to classify. The highest classification TP count was by the 
instance classifier for the same consideration with a TP count of 92.7%. Recall that if 
not initially detected by the convergence classifier, the power system instance moves 
to the instance classifier for detection. This appears to play a part in the low TP 
count for the convergence classifier and a high TP count for the instance classifier. 
These and other performance observations of the two classifiers are described in the 
following two subsections.
8.4.2 C onvergence C lassification
This subsection discusses the performance results of the convergence classifi­
cation for the IEEE 14-Bus power system by looking at which state variables had 
the most success when it comes to true positive classification. Recall tha t for the 
14-Bus power system the total number of input or converging state parameters is 
size{X%̂̂ l )  =  31. The exact state parameters included in this subset are stated in 
Chapter 6, Section 6.2.2 include a series of voltages, real and reactive power generated, 
and real and reactive powers consumed. The overall TP counts for the convergence 
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F igu re  8.11: IEEE 14-Bus Overall True Positive Convergence Classifier Results
The results of the TP convergence count presented in Figure 8.11 are similar to 
those presented for the 5-Bus power system. A Mil attack type was found to have the 
highest overall TP count. Recall for this type of attack two state variables are changed 
to a value other than zero. The attack type SII produced a slightly scaled down version 
of the Mil attack type graph. Both attack types alter the state parameters to a value 
other than zeros with the only difference being one is a single (S) variate attack while 
the other is a multivaraite (M) attack. Interestingly the attack I type attacks follow
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the similar scaled pattern with MI attack type possessing a higher classification count. 
These results indicate that attacks of type I, a changes to zero, are easier to detect 
for convergence state variables C\ and c2. These parameters correspond to the voltage 
readings at bus 1 and bus 2. For the attack type II, the highest TP counts occurred 
for converging variables C\, c2, c8, c14, ci6, c24, c2g, and C30. The exact state variables 
represented by these converging state parameters are shown in Table 8.5 along the 
with corresponding electrical descriptions.







Cl X i Voltage at Bus 1
C2 Voltage at Bus 2
C8 ^ 3 3 Reactive Power Generated Bus 6
C14 £39 Real Power Consumed Bus 6
Cl6 X41 Real Power Consumed Bus 10
c 24 X 4 9 Reactive Power Consumed Bus 5
C29 X 5 4 Reactive Power Consumed Bus 12
C30 ^ 5 5 Reactive Power Consumed Bus 13
8.4.3 Instance Classification
Instance classification is based on a dimensional transformation into a new 
space where comparisons can be made against a trusted model. The TP percentage 
for each of the four attack types are presented in Figure 8.12 for the case for the 
14-Bus power system. For comparisons, the results for each of the two considerations, 
with injected powers and without injected powers, are plotted. Results presented in 
Figure 8.12 are consistent with those presented for the case of the 5-Bus topology. 
For the case where the injected powers are considered, the average T P  percentage
I l l
is 92.7%, while for the case where injected powers are not considered, there was an 
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F igu re  8.12: 14-Bus Overall True Positive Instance Classifier Results
In an attem pt to determine which variables produced the highest instance 
classification, Figures 8.13 and 8.14 were constructed. This plot shows the TP count 
vs. power system state variables and is plotted for all four attack types simulated. 
Figure 8.13 reveals the results when the injected power are not being considered while 
Figure 8.14 presents the results for when they are being considered. By examining 
Figure 8.13, it is revealed that for the first 26 variables the MI attack type had the 
highest TP dropping below MIL The lowest was found to be the SI attack type which 















F igu re  8.13: IEEE 14-Bus Overall True Positive Instance Classifier Results, Without 
Injected Powers
For the first 56 state variables, Figure 8.14 maintains similar plots to that
of Figure 8.13, both of which have strong dips between variables x29 — x^e- These
variables are outlined in Table 6.5 and correspond to the reactive power generated,
real power consumed, and the reactive power consumed at each bus of the 14-Bus
power system. From the state variables x^7 — x136, the TP count relatively stabilizes
4t t* « I  j* t  \ *
V \ / \ /Wv "1 ~ ! Hi
r »  ! L *J.
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
State Variable










with only slight fluctuations. These variables correspond to the injected powers of the 
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F igu re  8.14: IEEE 14-Bus Overall True Positive Instance Classifier Results, W ith 
Injected Powers
8.4.4 False N egative
False negative (FN) classification is the classification of a cyber-event in a the 
non-malicious class. Recall that in order for this to happen, both the convergence
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classifier and the instance based classifier have to label the power system instance 
inaccurately as not containing a cyber-event.
-"—Without Injected Powers — With Injected Powers
F ig u re  8.15: IEE 14-Bus Overall False Negative Instance Classifier Results
attack types produced a near zero FN percentage. Startling results indicated that for 
the SI attack type, the case where injected powers are not being considered produced a 
FN percentage of 40%. Not as high, but still alarming is the other case where injected 
powers are being considered, which produced a FN percentage of 16.1%.
The performance assessment of the identification classifiers resulted in a total 
true positive classification of 309,903 out of the total 335,000 simulated cyber-events. 
Results indicate that the developed detection scheme identified 92.5% of the simulated 
cyber-events. Identification could happen at either the convergence or instance 
classifiers at which point localization is then performed. Furthermore, the assessment
40
SI SII MI Mil 
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The results shown in Figure 8.15 reveal that for three out of the four simulated
8.5 C onclusions
consisted of a total of four attack types being simulated with noticeable difference 
being observed in the developed detection scheme’s ability to detect each type. By 
collectively examining the results the hardest event to detect is a SI type attack where 
only one state variable is changed to zero at a time.
CHAPTER 9
CYBER-EVENT SOURCE LOCALIZATION RESULTS
9.1 Introduction
Event localization is the identification of the exact source(s) of the cyber- 
even^s). In the developed cyber-event detection framework, source localization is 
only performed once the presence of a cyber-event has been identified. The exact 
mathematical derivation of the localization approach utilized is presented in Chapter 4, 
Section 4.5. This chapter outlines the localization results of the cyber-events simulated 
in the previous chapter. The output of the localization for the case of a single variate 
attack is the identification of the power system state variable that was the source of 
the attack. With this particular knowledge in a live implementation of the developed 
detection scheme, a power engineer or cyber security expert is able to go right to the 
source of the problem.
For this assessment, a false positive analysis is performed along with a true 
positive analysis of the localization results for each of the considered cases. Results are 
presented in a composite form allowing for direct comparisons across each considered 
power system topology. These composite results are derived from the results shown 
in Appendix E. Figure 9.1 serves as an example for the discussion outlining the raw 
results associated with localization. This figure displays the results for each of the 23
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power system state variables when a SII attack is performed against the 5-Bus power 
system. The total number of events are shown in the ”cyber-event count” plot. The 
state variable that produced the lowest localization results was found to be X13 with a 
localization count of 11% while the highest was found on state variable X\$ with a 
localization count of 89%. Recall that according to Table 6.3 the electrical meaning 
of X13 describes the reactive power being generated at bus 3 while represents the 
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Figure 9.1: 5-Bus W ithout Line Flows SII Localization Results
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9.2 False Positive Analysis
The false positive (FP) localization results for each considered topology are 
shown in Figure 9.2. A false positive localization is the labeling of a power system 
state variable as being the source of an event when the simulated event occurred on 
another state variable. Results are plotted for each topology and each consideration 
according to the attack type tested. The FP % is a total percentage out of the total 
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Figure 9.2: Overall False Positive Localization Results
The results shown in Figure 9.2 reveals that the 14-Bus power system had 
the highest FP rate for any given system. The 14-Bus system for the case where 
injected powers are included at the highest with an average of 7% for all four attack 
types simulated. The event detection scheme for the 5-Bus power system had a FP 
percentage of on average 1% for each consideration, during each of the four simulated 
attack types. This corresponds to a very low FP rate and means that for the 175,000 
simulated attacks on the 5-Bus system only 1,750 were inaccurately localized.
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9.3 True Positive Analysis
This section assesses the overall performance of the localization approach by 
comparing the true positive (TP) classification of each system under each consideration. 
TP classification for the localization stage describes the exact identification of the source 
of the cyber-event. Results of this analysis are presented in Figure 9.3. These results 









5-Bus Without 5-Bus With 14-Bus Without 14-Bus With 
F ig u re  9.3: Overall True Positive Localization Results
The results shown in Figure 9.3 reveals a common trend among each considered 
power system topology. For the type I attacks, the average of all four considerations 
was found to be 11.7%. As noted in the previous sections, a type I attack is hard to 
detect because these type of attacks are small fluctuations away from the means of most 
normalized state variables. For all but one consideration, the TP classification results 
were found to be over 65%. This exception was for the 5-Bus power system whose TP
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percentage was calculated at 36.8%. The localization true positive and false negative 
results for each system are described separately in the next two sections. Though 
these results are not ideal, they are promising. Possible approaches for increasing the 
TP rate while decreasing the FP classification of the localization stage are described 
in Chapter 12, Section 12.2.3.
9.4 5-Bus Localization Results
In an attempt to better understand the results of Figure 9.3, the true positive 
results are analyzed in this section, specifically for the 5-Bus power system. This 
analysis also goes on to determine exactly which variables had the highest TP counts 
and which had the lowest. The TP percentages are shown in Figures 9.4 and 9.5 
for the 5-Bus system when the injected powers are not and are being considered. 
Figure 9.4 examines the TP percentages for the case where the injected powers are 
not considered while Figure 9.5 examines the case where they are being considered. 
The results shown in both figures are relative to the number of attacks that were 
performed on each specific power system state variable. For instance, for the power 
state variable Xi shown in Figure 9.4, a total of 214 SI attacks were performed with a 
TP localization count of 213. This corresponds to a TP percentage of 99.5% as shown 
in 9.4.
According to Chapter 6 , Section 6.3, for the case where the injected powers are 
not being considered there are 23 power system state variables being analyzed. The 
exact electrical meaning of each variable is shown in Table 6.3. As shown in Figure
9.4, the bus voltages for attack types SI and MI have the highest TP percentages with
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near 100% classification rates. For both attack types, however, the percentages drop 
to near zero values. For the other two attack types, SII and Mil, the TP percentage is 
an average 80% with the exception of the SII attack type for only 4 variables. These 
exact four correspond to the real and reactive powers being generated at bus 1 and 
bus 3. The cause of these drops corresponds to the fact that these state variables 
have a higher range of acceptable values which still produce feasible power system 
instances. The box and whisker plots for each of these variables is shown in Figure 
A.4. Upon close inspection of Figure A.4 it is determined that the reactive power at 
bus 3, ’QG3’, has the greatest range causing the lowest localization results for the 
corresponding state variable, £ 13, as shown by Figure 9.4.
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F ig u re  9.4: 5-Bus True Positive Localization Results, Without Injected Powers
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Similar to the previous plots in Figure 9.4, Figure 9.5 shows the TP percentages 
for the 5-Bus power system when the injected powers are taken into consideration. 
The corresponding electrical meanings of each state variable Xi are shown in Table
6.4. For the first 23 state variables results are near consistent with those of the case 
without considering injected powers. One of the major differences, however, is found 
in the consistent drop in the average of the M il attack type. These results indicate 
a 70% average while before the average was 80%. Lastly, there appears to be three 
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F ig u re  9.5: 5-Bus True Positive Localization Results, With Injected Powers
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9.5 IEEE 14-Bus Localization R esults
Similar to the analysis performed for the 5-Bus system, the T P  percentages 
shown in Figures 9.6 and 9.7 are the relative counts for the IEEE 14-Bus power 
system. The corresponding electrical meanings of the state variables for the case 
where the injected powers are not being considered are listed in Table 6.5. Upon close 
examination, the results are also consistent to the type of attack and to the electrical 
meaning of the state variables the attack was performed on. For instance, as shown in 
Figure 9.6, the highest TP percentages with near 100% counts occurred during MI 
attacks for the voltages on voltages controlled busses. For the non-voltage controlled 
busses, the percentages drop to near 0% for MI attacks. These trends occur for both 
the SI and MI attack types.
With only a few exceptions, for attack types SI and Mil, there is a consistent 
average of the TP percentage of 81%. The exception corresponds to when SII attack 
types are performed on state variables 2:28, ^29, £30, and X31. These four variables 
correspond to the real and reactive powers being generated at busses 1 and 2. Unlike 
the 5-Bus case, for the state variables x ^8 — £56, the SII attack types resulted in 
higher TP percentages than those of the M il attack type. Another observation that 
is similar to the 5-Bus system are results of the IEEE 14-Bus system for the first 56 
state variables. These variables are consistent across both considerations as shown in 
Figures 9.6 and 9.7.
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Figure 9.6: IEEE 14-Bus True Positive Localization, W ithout Injected Powers
The electrical meaning of the state variables plotted in Figure 9.7 are listed 
in Table 6.6 and include the injected powers flowing through the transmission lines. 
These results are consistent with those shown in the previous figure and exhibits the 
same trends as that of the 5-Bus power system. As shown in Figure 9.7, the attack 
types MI and SI have roughly the same TP percentages dropping down to near zero 
for all state variables after x u . There is also a grouping pattern for the line flows with 
the first set between x56 — xg$ and the second between xg7 — .x136.
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Figure 9.7: IEEE 14-Bus True Positive Localization, With Injected Powers
On average, it appears that for attack type SII, the injected real powers, 
X50 — x 96, have a higher TP percentage than the injected reactive powers x 97 — X\sq. 
This average was fount to be 74% with only two dropping below 40%. The reactive 
powers, however, for the SII attack type fluctuated with a TP percent range between 
2.6% and 90%. For the IEEE 14-Bus power system the localization results indication 
extreme difficulties in the identification of SI and MI type attacks.
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9.6 Conclusions
The localization results presented in this chapter examines the collective false 
positive results along with performing a detailed examination into the true positive 
localization of each power system. These examinations are measured according to the 
the total number off attacks performed on a given state variable. Results indicate 
a near 100% successful localization for the voltage state variable only on voltage 
controlled busses all power systems when a SI or MI attack is performed. SII attacks 





A stealthy attack is one that evades the identification and localization of the 
developed cyber-event detection scheme. This chapter analyzes these events in an 
effort to extract patterns and gain insight into what the developed scheme is not able 
to detect. Results are presented according to the attack types simulated and the 
power system topology utilized. Such an analysis provides insight into the regions of 
detectability and provides a basis for improving the scheme as outlined in Chapter 12. 
Results are presented in the following two sections for the 5-Bus and 14-Bus power 
systems. The results presented in this chapter correspond to the false negative (FN) 
results presented in the two previous sections, collectively. However, in the case of 
this examination, emphasis is on determining which state variables, when attacked, 
produced a false negative classification. Results presented here are in the form of 
relative percentages corresponding to the total number of attacks performed on that 




Figures 10.1 and 10.2 reveal the false negative results of the developed detection 
scheme for the 5-Bus power system. Figure 10.1 reveals the FN percentages in the 
case where the injected powers are not being considered while Figure 10.2 presents the 
results for when they are being considered in the calculation. The electrical meaning 
of each power system state variable x t for the 5-Bus power system are listed in Tables
6.3 and 6.4. As shown in Figure 10.1, every attack performed for this scenario was 
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Figure 10.1: 5-Bus False Negative, Without Injected Powers
For the case where the injected powers are included, however, not every attack 
was detected. For instance, by examining Figure 10.2, it is revealed that the developed 
detection scheme was not able to detect certain SI attacks. The state variables that 
produced these unobservable attacks include the bus voltage angles 0i at busses 2, 3, 
4, and 5. Results indicate the highest included 02 corresponding to a failed detection
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of 36.6% for this particular state variable. Failure to detect attacks on the bus 
voltage angles 9t was also noticed for SII and MI attack types. Though for these two 
attack types, failure to detect remained under 5%. The SII attack type also produced 
interesting results for the bus voltages X\ — x^. Failure to detect a SII type voltage 
attack on bus three was found to be 4%. Though not a high number, this is cause for 
some concern. Recall that according to the one line diagram shown in Figure A.l, bus 
3 is a PV bus and any inaccurately reported voltage parameters on this bus may have 
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10.3 IEEE 14-Bus
The results of the stealthy attack analysis for the IEEE 14-Bus power system 
are shown in Figures 10.3 and 10.4. The electrical meaning of each power system state 
variable :r, for the IEEE 14-Bus power system are listed in Tables 6.5 and 6.6. Figure
10.3 presents the results for when the injected powers are not being considered while 
Figure 10.4 reveals the results for when the injected powers are being considered. The 
results presented in Figure 10.3 are not directly consistent with those presented for 
the 5-Bus case. However, the detection performance of each attack type was similar 
with SI still remaining the hardest to detect.
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F igu re  10.4: IEEE 14-Bus False Negative, With Injected Powers
For the case where the injected power are not considered, the attacks com­
promising the loads appear to have the highest failure to detect percentages. This 
information is revealed in Figure 10.3 and shows that for SI attack type failure to 
detect on average load parameter attacks was 75%. The average failure to detect 
for load attacks dropped down to 31% for MI type attacks and to 8% for SII type 
attacks. Furthermore, for the voltage angles, only two busses contribute to the failure 
to detect percentages. The highest was for a SI attack on the voltage angle 03 with 
and FN value of 64%. Other spikes in the FN percentages were found to exist on this 
particular state variable. Specifically, failure to detect a MI attack was found to be 
25% while failure to detect for SII events was 12.2%.
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For the case where the injected powers are considered, there appears to be four 
distinct groups in the failure to detect percentages. Specifically as shown in Figure
10.4, these four groups include attacks on state variables G1 =  [215, 216, 217, 213], 
G2 — [£32, 233], G3 =  [ 2 4 7 , 2 5 0 ] ,  and G4 =  [ 2 7 9 , 2 3 1 ] .  G1 corresponds to the voltage 
angles for bus 2, 3, 4, and 5. G2 corresponds to the reactive powers generated at 
Busses 6 and 7. The G3 grouping corresponds to the bus 3 and 6 reactive loads. 
The last grouping, G4, corresponds to the injected powers specifically P4_2 and P4_3. 
Recall that according to, this notation P  j means that the power flowing from i to j .
The highest failure to detect percentage was found in G3 and corresponds to 
an SI attack on state variable 2 50 with a FNsi(xm) — 93%. This variable corresponds 
to the reactive power being consumed on bus 6 which drops down to below 10% for 
both the SII and MI attack types. The highest failure to detect for SII attacks was 
calculated to be on state variable 2 32 with a F N sii{x32) = 19.9%. This corresponds 
to the reactive power generated at bus 6 .
10.4 Conclusions
The work performed in this chapter assessed the developed cyber-event detection 
scheme by determining a set of attacks which evaded detection. Looking at all the 
attacks performed, there is only a small subset that was able to avoid detection by 
the developed framework. The analysis was performed in the context of the electrical 
parameters. As expected, the results indicate that the easiest attack to detect was 
a M il type attack while the hardest was found to be SI attacks. Nevertheless, it 
was determined that only certain SI attacks remained undetectable by the detection
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scheme. Generally, SI type attacks that compromised the voltage angles while those 
that attack other state variables were for the most part detectable. For the 14-Bus 
power system, it was determined that the hardest attacks to detect was those which 




Using uniquely crafted machine learning algorithms, this dissertation success­
fully demonstrated a cyber-event detection framework based purely on the extraction 
of information from the physical perspective of two power systems. Examination 
targeted a 5-Bus power system [2] and the IEEE 14-Bus power system [79]. The 
physical perspective utilized by the detection framework was derived by extracting 
key features from power system state variables including voltage magnitudes, voltage 
angles, real and reactive powers generated, along with the real and reactive powers 
consumed. Furthermore, effort was taken to replicate the losses of each power system 
by including the impedances of each transmission line.
For this examination, a total of four attack types were simulated encompassing 
both single variate and multivariate attacks which compromised randomly selected 
power system state variables. The objective of the framework was to detect and localize 
these attacks or cyber-events. Two classifiers were used to identify the presence of 
a cyber-event while a form of outlier detection was used to localize the event. The 
developed framework was able to identify a total of 92.5% of the 335,000 events and 
for certain considerations localized over 80%.
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11.2 Framework Classifiers and Param eters
The developed cyber-event detection framework relies on a combination of 
trained classifiers to identify and localize events. Both identification and localization 
could only be performed once the parameters of each classifier were determined. This 
section outlines the selection results of the classifier parameters which were then used 
in the detection framework. The following list provides a summary of the recommended 
parameters for the developed framework while Section 11.4 describes the resulting 
performance observations of the detection approach.
1. Convergence Classifier
A total of four discriminant classifiers were tested for each of the considered
power system topologies. The tested classifiers included linear, diagonal 
linear, quadratic, and diagonal quadratic discriminant classifiers. For each 
considered power system topology, the classifier that outperformed was the 
quadratic discriminant classifier when a training size of n > 3000 was used. 
Based on the initial test results the quadratic discriminant was selected for 
the first stage of the developed framework.
2. Instance Classifier
Instance classification is based on transforming the power system instance
into a reduced dimensional space where new features were then extracted. 
Using the Hotelling’s T2 value of each power system instance in the trusted 
models, a distribution was created that defines normal operation for each 
system. If the Hotelling’s T2 value of a suspect power system instance was 
found to be more than three standard deviations away from the distribution
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of the trusted model, then the associated power system instance was labeled 
as containing a cyber-event. The T2 distribution could either be calculated 
before or during inspection of the new power system instance.
3. Localization Classifier
Localization is based on the Grubbs Test, which also uses a trusted power
system instance to derive a trusted model. The test is univariate in nature
when looking at each state variable, independently. For this reason, it is
suggested that the associated statistics of the Grubbs Test be calculated
prior to event localization.
11.3 Com putational Constraints
With the parameters and classifiers selected according to the details outlined 
in the previous section, an analysis into the computation constraints was performed. 
Though not mathematically derived, the computational constraints of the developed 
cyber-event detection framework were measured using CPU time. The execution time 
for each topology under each consideration is shown in Table 11.1. These results 
indicate an increase in the computational complexity provided the given times required 
to compute the existence of a cyber-event. Recall that if a cyber-event is detected by 
the convergence classifier the instance classification, or PC A transformation, is skipped. 
This substantially reduces computation time for the detection of the cyber-events.
The results shown in Table 11.1 were computed on a Dual-Core Intel Xeon with 
a processor speed of 3 GHz and 16 GB of RAM. The most computational intense aspect 
of the scheme is the PCA transformation, which in its current setup is calculating the
137
Table 11.1: Detection Scheme Computational Time (s)
5-Bus 14-Bus
Convergence Instance Convergence Instance
W ithout 0.11 0.78 0.16 2.55
W ith 0.14 2.04 0.31 10.5
transformation of the trusted model every time a new power system instance is placed 
in the queue. This, however, does not have to be the case as the transformation of 
the trusted model can be calculated offline and updated periodically. The developed 
cyber-event detection scheme was tested using the Matlab [86] framework and is 
considered an interpreted language, resulting in slower execution times. Also, through 
code optimization it is believed that the developed detection scheme can meet the 
real time analysis constraints. Furthermore, it is believed that given the current 
rate of growth for CPU/GPU power, the developed detection scheme will not reach 
hardware limitations for small to medium size power system topologies. Such hardware 
limitations are becoming non-existent and computational efficiency can be reached in 
software [87].
11.4 Framework Performance
The developed cyber-event detection framework relies on a combination of 
trained classifiers to identify and localize events. This section outlines several key 
observations made by analyzing the identification and localization results of the 
developed framework. These observations are based on the true positive and false 
negative classification of the 335,000 simulated cyber-events. A list of parameters and 
summary observations of the developed detection framework include the following:
1. Detectability of Attack Types
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Upon analyzing the results, it was determined that some attack types were 
easier to detect than others. The overall order of difficulty in detectability 
from hardest to easiest for the four attack types are: SI, SII, MI, and MIL 
These differences however small are presented in the TP results shown in 
Tables 8.4 and 8.10.
2. Weakness to Specific State Variable Attacks
Discussed in the stealthy attack chapter, Chapter 10, the variables that
appeared to avoid detection the most were attacks on the bus voltage 
angles. One possible explanation for this is that these state variables have 
a much larger range of acceptable values than the other power system 
state variables. Also, mathematically the angles contribute predominately 
to the first principal component which appears to diminish the events’ 
contribution to the Hotelling T2 value.
3. False Positive Analysis
The false positive analysis performed in Chapter 8 never reached over 10%
with three of the eight simualtion conditions producing a near 0% FP 
percentage.
4. True Positive Analysis
The true positive analysis revealed that 93% of the simulated attacks were
identified while the source of the event was successfully localized for 90% 
of the state variables. The 10% that were not able to be localized occurred 
only on specific state variables. Furthermore, it is noted that even though 
the exact source of the event has not been identified, the power system
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instance has been labeled as containing a cyber-event and can undergo 
additional analysis. These additional modifications are described in Chapter 
12 .
11.5 Conclusions
The identification of 93% of the simulated attacks indicates that the developed 
detection framework demonstrates the latent potential that exists in using historical 
power system state information for the detection of cyber intrusions. Based on the 
results presented in this dissertation, it is recommended that the scheme be tested 
in live power systems, or at the very least, receive additional testing using historical 
SCADA databases from active power systems. The developed cyber-event detection 
scheme is currently designed to be completely passive, executing only read privileges of 
system databases. Furthermore, several additions/enhancements have been suggested 
in the future work section of this dissertation. These modifications will certainly prove 
to be valuable in the future development of the framework and lays the foundation for 
the creation of an intrusion detection system specifically tailored for the power grid 
and other cyber-physical systems.
C H A P T E R  12
F U T U R E  W O R K
12.1 Introduction
With the successful development and assessment of an application centered 
cyber detection scheme described in this dissertation, future advancements to this 
scheme can be made. This chapter explores the different avenues that can be pursued 
to either improve or complement the developed detection scheme. Some improvements 
include computational modifications to the classifiers while the complementary work 
includes adding an IT based perspective for a correlated cyber-physical intrusion 
detection scheme. Other possible avenues include the utilization of the developed 
detection scheme in the context of incident response. If a cyber-event is believed 
to have occurred on a power system state variable, then with some modification, 
the scheme could be used to isolate the event proving fruitful as a forensics tool. 
Such forensics analysis could be performed on the SCADA Historian servers. The 
suggested modifications require additional power system topologies and more integrated 
mathematical constructs and therefore are out of the scope of the current approach 
developed by this dissertation.
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12.2 M odifying Classifiers
The results of the developed detection scheme discussed in the previous three 
Chapters, Chapters 8, 9, and 10, are promising. Through certain modifications of the 
developed classifiers, it may be possible to increase the classification results to even 
more desired levels. This section proposes some possible modifications that may prove 
fruitful in the future development of the cyber-event detection scheme.
12.2.1 Convergence Classifier
Recall that according to Section 4.3, the convergence classifier uses discriminate 
analysis to determine if a subset of power system state variables form a feasible set. 
The training models were based purely on solutions to the power flow problem which 
was solved using the Newton-Raphson method. However, one drawback of using only 
the Newton-Raphson method is that this approach may not converge even for feasible 
inputs into the power flow problem [84]. The power flow analysis therefore will bias 
the convergence classifier in favor of the non-converging class or the malicious class. 
This is because even though the inputs create a feasible power system instance, the 
set of inputs are placed in the wrong set by the training of the classifier.
A possible approach to this problem is through the integration of a variety of 
known solutions to the power flow problem. Such a variety will ensure that the feasible 
region is covered in the classifier. Other possible iterative solutions to the power flow 
problem include the Guess-Seidel method [1] and modifications to the power flow 
problem itself as those discussed in [88, 89, 90]. Lastly, the works presented in [91, 92]
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actively seeks to mathematically define the boundaries of the feasible regions will not 
doubt be of use in these enhancements of the convergence classifier.
12.2.2 Instance Classifier
The instance classifier used a technique known as principal component analysis 
(PCA) to transform power system instance into a new dimensional space for compar­
isons. Comparisons are made against a trusted model in effort th a t is designed to 
detection anomalies. This process is mathematically presented in Section 4.4. One 
problem with this particular approach is when an attack occurs on a state variable 
whose feature projections on the first few principal components are small to non­
existent. Using the current detection method, this type of attack would go unnoticed. 
Potential solutions to this problem include a technique known as weighted PCA which 
has produced promising results in the areas of biometric identification [93, 94] and 
diagnostic medicine [95, 96].
12.2.3 Localization
The localization of cyber-events was based on a form of outlier detection and 
therefore is week against attacks that inject state variables on x.t that are close to the 
mean x t of the trusted models. If temporal data along with other key features are 
retained, as explained in Section 12.4, this will increase the number of attacks that 
can successfully be localized.
12.3 Examining Forensics Im plem entation
Current implementation of the developed cyber-event detection scheme is 
geared towards live power systems. As noted previously in Chapter 4, the trusted
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models are built on historical power system state variables stored inside the SCADA 
system. W ith slight modification however the developed approach may be able to 
be used in the context of a forensics analysis. By performing the detection scheme 
utilizing an iterative form of cross validation on a suspicious historical dataset, it 
would be possible to isolate and identified when the attack occurred and on what 
power system state variable.
12.4 Increase Power System  Features
Power systems are a unique environment with set operational limits that are 
either defined by fundamental electrical laws or are set in place by the system’s design 
engineers. In any case, these constraints offer additional insight into the status of 
the power system. By adding this treasure trove of data to the developed intrusion 
detection, it is possible to create an even more intelligent intrusion detection system.
Potential power system features include the following:
1. Generation Contraints
Generation contrasts are based on rated values of various generation facilities
throughout the power system topology and includes the limits on real and 
reactive powers generated. By incorporating this information beforehand 
into the training models of the convergence and localization classifiers, a 
decrease in the feasible region will be observed, enabling more accurate 
classification.
2. Economic Dispatching
Economic dispatching is the act of dispatching power generation according
to cost functions predetermined by the power system design engineers. This
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process can save a utility millions annually [1, 28] and places more limits 
on the generation of each generation facility.
3. Load Profiles
Load profiles describe the retention of power consumption by the loads 
through the topology and is temporal in nature [28]. Integration of these 
features may provide a basis for more sophisticated localization approaches 
including neural nets.
4. Device Configuration
Similar to generation constraints, the retention of device configuration
will set limits into the computational analysis used to develop the trusted 
models. Configurations may include position of tap changing transforms, 
relay settings, and the settings of other intelligent electronic devices spread 
throughout the topology.
12.5 Integration Into a Cyber-Physical D etection  Scheme
A new high confident detection scheme can be developed that merges the 
work described here with the information gained by observing information technology 
parameters. Such a detection scheme can be called high confident as it brings together 
the physical and cyber perspectives into a unified perspective that is self verifying and 
complementary. Therefore, an extension of this dissertation includes the development 
of a unified cyber-physical high confident intrusion detection scheme for the critical 
infrastructure power grid. High confident detection is provided by the correlation of 
the cyber control infrastructure and the physical power system perspectives resulting
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in a derived approach which encompasses the interacting dynamics between them. 
This derived approach will yield a new unified perspective for the creation of a novel 
high confident intrusion detection scheme.
By observing high level grouping phenomenon in both the power system (bus 
voltages, phase angles, circuit breaker status, and tap changing transformer position, 
among others) and cyber system (throughput, payloads, MACs, IPs, packet latencies, 
amongst others) simultaneously, it is possible to derive a unified perspective. By 
observing these two perspectives both independently and collectively, dynamics will be 
observed that encompass how these two perspectives interact. Figure 12.1 shows the 
overall process of this proposed future work. The four main steps for a high confident 
detection framework include the following: data aggregation, pattern and correlated 
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F ig u re  12.1: Suggested Future Approach for High Confident Intrusion Detection
1. D a ta  A ggregation:
Data aggregation can be accomplished by bringing together both perspec­
tives and all available information used to describe the cyber-physical system.
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Aggregation of the cyber system perceptive can be derived by examining a) 
past observations and b) current observations of the cyber network controlling 
the physical power system. Observations are the result of strategically placed 
network observers which provide the following network attributes: throughput, 
payloads, MACs, IPs, packet latencies, amongst others. This information can be 
added to the information utilized by the detection scheme successfully developed 
by this dissertation.
2. Pattern and Correlated Pattern Recognition:
Pattern recognition is the result of information retrieval methodologies 
wherein patterns from large datasets are extracted across both perspectives. 
Such patterns can be extracted via the extensive analysis on the data aggre­
gated, which contains a collection of power system states and cyber network 
states, independently. Dimensionality reduction and kernel transformations into 
different dimensional spaces provide a means for the extraction of information 
(patterns) provided by the decrease in redundant information. In a similar way, 
perspectives can be combined and correlated patterns are to be extracted, which 
express relationships between the cyber and physical perspectives. A potential 
correlated pattern includes while the physical power system is in an undesired 
state the energy management system (EMS) will send certain commands (network 
packets) to the controllers in the power system. By observing features from 
one perspective, inferences can be made describing the other, resulting in a 
derived unified perspective combining all available cyber-physical information. 
Promising feature extraction techniques have already been identified for both
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the cyber perspective [59] and physical perspective by the work performed here 
in this dissertation.
3. Hybrid Classification:
Based on results described in this dissertation that describe a detection 
scheme using the physical perspective, it is suggested that the unified classifica­
tion scheme developed will be hybrid in nature. A hybrid approach brings the 
benefits of multiple classification algorithms together into a single classification 
approach accomplishing more than just one algorithm can accomplish alone. 
Such techniques in the discipline of knowledge discovery is known as ensembles. 
As shown in Figure 12.1, classification is to occur at the cyber and physical 
perspectives independently while also occurring at the collectively derived 
perspective. This particular structure for classification produces an environment 
for a highly confident intrusion detection scheme with each perspective either 
validating or identifying the intrusion.
4. Incident Identification:
The classification of each state is based on the hybrid approaches and 
feature extraction methods to be developed. Incident identification is the 
result of examining the classification and attributes of each perspective both 
independently and collectively. By cross examining the classification performed 
by each perspective, the true result and method of the intrusion can be identified. 
For instance, if the cyber perspective successfully classifies and extracts a spoofed 
control packet and a change in the power system state is observed to be reflective
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of that spoofed command, then it can be concluded within high confidence the 
method and target of the intrusion.
12.6 Conclusions
Though the work developed by this dissertation is promising, certain modi­
fications and enchantments may increase the overall accuracy and efficiency of the 
developed approach. This chapter proposed several possible near term enhancements 
while also proposing an approach tha t would integrate the cyber perspective to 
the developed cyber-event detection framework. The approach developed by this 
dissertation uses power system variables to reach a physically derived conclusion while 
a cyber detection scheme uses network telemetry and packet payload data to reach 
conclusions. The integration of the two perspective will produce an intrusions detection 






A .l  System  Details
C = Dslack
Figure A .l:  5-Bus One-line Diagram
Table A .l:  5-Bus Transmission Line Impedances [2]
Line # Bus - Bus R X B
1 1 - 2 0.042 0.168 0.041
2 2 - 5 0.031 0.126 0.031
3 to i CO 0.031 0.126 0.031
4 3 - 4 0.084 0.336 0.082
5 CO i Cn 0.053 0.210 0.051
6 4 - 5 0.063 0.252 0.061
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A .2 Power Flow Sim ulation Snapshots
Table A .2: 5-Bus Input Snapshot
Bus # Type V D elta PG QG PL QL
1 0 1.040 0 - - 0.65 0.3
2 1 - - 0 0 1.150 0.6
3 2 1.020 - 1.8 - 0.7 0.4
4 1 - - 0 0 0.7 0.3
5 1 - - 0 0 0.850 0.4
Table A .3: 5-Bus Output (Bold) Snapshot
Bus # Type V D elta PG QG PL QL
1 0 1.040 0 2.347 1.001 0.65 0.3
2 1 0.9614 -6.322 0 0 1.150 0.6
3 2 1.020 -3.713 1.8 1.103 0.7 0.4
4 1 0.9204 -10.88 0 0 0.7 0.3
5 1 0.9683 -6.162 0 0 0.850 0.4
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Figure A .2: Boxplot 5-Bus Voltages, 500 Instances
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B .l  System  D etails
4'-
o CO.
F ig u re  B .l  : 14-Bus One-line Diagram
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Table B .l:  14-Bus Transmission Line Impedances
Line # B us - B us R X B
1 1 - 2 0.01938 0.05917 0.0528
2 1 - 5 0.05403 0.22304 0.0492
3 2 - 3 0.04699 0.19797 0.0438
4 2 - 4 0.05811 0.17632 0.0374
5 2 - 5 0.05695 0.17388 0.034
6 3 - 4 0.06701 0.17103 0.0346
7 4 - 5 0.01335 0.04211 0.0128
8 4 - 7 0 0.20912 0
9 4 - 9 0 0.55618 0
10 5 - 6 0 0.25202 0
11 6 -  11 0.09498 0.1989 0
12 6 -  12 0.12291 0.25581 0
13 6 -  13 0.06615 0.13027 0
14 7 - 8 0 0.17615 0
15 7 - 9 0 0.11001 0
16 9 -  10 0.03181 0.08450 0
17 9 - 14 0.12711 0.27038 0
18 10 - 11 0.08205 0.19207 0
19 12 - 13 0.22092 0.19988 0
20 13- 14 0.17093 0.34802 0
B .2 Pow er Flow S im ulation  S n apsho ts
Table B.2: 14-Bus Input Snapshot
B us # T y p e V D elta P G QG PL QL
1 0 1.06 0 - - 0 0
2 2 1.045 - 0.4 - .217 0.127
3 2 1.01 - 0 .0234 .942 0.190
4 1 - - 0 0 .478 -0.039
5 1 - - 0 0 .076 0.016
6 2 1.07 - 0 .0122 .112 0.0750
7 1 - - 0 0 0 0
8 2 1.09 - 0 0 0 0
9 1 - - 0 .0174 0.2950 0.1660
10 1 - - 0 0 0.0900 0.0580
11 1 - - 0 0 0.0350 0.0180
12 1 - - 0 0 0.0610 0.0160
13 1 - - 0 0 0.1350 0.0580
14 1 - - 0 0 0.1490 0.0500
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Table B.3: 14-Bus Output (Bold) Snapshot
Bus # Type V D elta PG QG PL QL
1 0 1.06 0 2.324 -0.236 0 0
2 2 1.045 -4.951 0.4 -0.270 .217 0.127
3 2 1.01 -12.61 0 .0234 .942 0.190
4 1 1.0296 -10.41 0 0 .478 -0.039
5 1 1.0351 -8.963 0 0 .076 0.016
6 2 1.07 -14.72 0 .0122 .112 0.0750
7 1 1.0536 -13.54 0 0 0 0
8 2 1.09 -13.54 0 0 0 0
9 1 1.0447 -15.15 0 .0174 0.2950 0.1660
10 1 1.0417 -15.36 0 0 0.0900 0.0580
11 1 1.0522 -15.17 0 0 0.0350 0.0180
12 1 1.0543 -15.57 0 0 0.0610 0.0160
13 1 1.0487 -15.62 0 0 0.1350 0.0580
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Figure B.14: 14-Bus Reactive Powers Injected, 500 Instances
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C .l 5-Bus Transformation
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Figure C.2: 500 5-Bus Scores and Feature Vectors Transformed
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F ig u re  C.3: Hotelling T2 of 500 5-Bus Instances Without Line Flows
T2 Value
F ig u re  C.4: Histogram and Rayleigh Curve Fit of T2 values for 500 5-Bus Instances 
W ithout Line Flows
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C.2 IEEE 14-Bus Transformation
C.2.1 W ithout Line Flows
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F ig u re  C.12: Histogram and Rayleigh Curve Fit of T2 values for 500 5-Bus Instances 
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Figure C.14: 500 14-Bus Scores and Feature Vectors Transformed
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D .l  5-Bus Identification
D.1.1 W ithout Line Flows
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Figure D .l:  5-Bus Without Line Flows SI Classification Results
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Figure D.2: 5-Bus Without Line Flows SII Classification Results
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Figure D.3: 5-Bus Without Line Flows MI Classification Results
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Figure D.4: 5-Bus Without Line Flows Mil Classification Results
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D .1.2 W ith  Line Flows









Figure D.5: 5-Bus With Line Flows SI Classification Results
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Figure D.6: 5-Bus W ith Line Flows SII Classification Results
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Figure D.7: 5-Bus With Line Flows MI Classification Results
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Figure D.8: 5-Bus With Line Flows Mil Classification Results
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D .2 IEEE 14-Bus Identification
D.2.1 W ithout Line Flows
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Figure D.9: IEEE 14-Bus Without Line Flows SI Classification Results
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Figure D.10: IEEE 14-Bus Without Line Flows SII Classification Results
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Figure D . l l :  IEEE 14-Bus Without Line Flows MI Classification Results
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Figure D.13: IEEE 14-Bus With Line Flows SI Classification Results
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Figure D.14: IEEE 14-Bus With Line Flows SII Classification Results
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Figure D.15: IEEE 14-Bus With Line Flows MI Classification Results
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Figure D.16: IEEE 14-Bus With Line Flows Mil Classification Results
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E .l 5-Bus Localization
E.1.1 W ithout Line Flows 










Figure E .l: 5-Bus Without Line Flows SI Localization Results
Table E .l: 5-Bus W ithout Line Flows SI Localization Results
Event Variable Num ber of Events Localized % Identified
x l 214 213 99.5
x 2 237 235 99.2
x 3 210 205 97.6
X 4 236 232 98.3
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Table E.2: 5-Bus Without Line Flows SII Localization Results
Event Variable Num ber of Events Localized % Identified
X j 405 328 81.0
X2 421 356 84.7
x3 463 374 80.8
X 4 409 350 85.6
x 5 439 376 85.7
x 6 427 354 82.9
x 7 433 359 82.9
x 8 457 366 80.0
Xg 466 395 84.8
X10 403 192 47.6
Xu 423 223 52.7
X12 419 93 22.2
%13 451 49 10.9
%14 485 382 78.8
Xl5 416 281 67.6
Xl6 431 341 79.1
x 17 429 317 73.9
X18 458 334 72.9
Xl9 452 400 88.5
X20 430 337 78.4
X21 435 381 87.6
X22 396 343 86.6
X23 452 383 84.7
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F ig u re  E.3: 5-Bus Without Line Flows MI Localization Results
Table E.3: 5-Bus Without Line Flows MI Localization Results
E vent V ariable N u m b er o f E vents Localized % Iden tified
Xi 822 822 100
850 850 100
x 3 842 842 100
X4 889 887 99.8
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F ig u re  E.4: 5-Bus Without Line Flows Mil Localization Results
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Table E.4: 5-Bus W ithout Line Flows Mil Localization Results
E ven t V ariab le N u m b er o f E ven ts Localized % Iden tified
*1 849 693 81.6
*2 900 769 85.4
* 3 834 676 81.1
X 4 840 722 86.0
x 5 861 756 87.8
x 6 887 746 84.1
x 7 848 698 82.3
*8 871 676 77.6
Xg 867 737 85.0
*10 847 355 41.9
X u 902 486 53.9
*12 864 206 23.8
*13 880 97 11.0
X 14 860 698 81.2
*15 898 598 66.6
*16 856 666 77.8
X t f 842 662 78.6
*18 894 655 73.2
*19 885 803 90.7
*20 854 694 81.3
*21 885 753 85.1
*22 899 805 89.5
*23 877 753 85.9
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Figure E.5: 5-Bus With Line Flows SI Localization Results
Table E.5: 5-Bus W ith Line Flows SI Localization Results
Event Variable Num ber of Events Localized % Identified
Xi 849 693 81.6
900 769 85.4
*£3 834 676 81.1
£ 4 840 722 86.0
£5 861 756 87.8
£ 6 887 746 84.1
£7 848 698 82.3
£g 871 676 77.6
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X1 428 363 84.8 X25 416 215 51.7
x 2 442 373 84.4 X26 413 274 66.3
x3 410 349 85.1 X27 457 332 72.6
X4 439 365 83.1 X28 454 272 60.0
X5 463 402 86.8 X29 435 349 80.2
x 6 436 363 83.3 ^30 392 272 69.4
x 7 450 370 82.2 X31 447 376 84.1
Xg 440 350 79.5 X32 421 363 86.2
x9 417 372 89.2 X33 411 254 61.8
x 10 378 158 41.8 X34 425 332 78.1
x n 402 220 54.7 X35 448 365 81.5
x n 410 95 23.2 x 36 426 168 39.4
x n 427 48 11.2 X37 382 180 47.1
X\4 434 338 77.9 X38 396 174 43.9
x n 437 299 68.4 X39 413 137 33.2
X\& 394 299 75.9 X40 432 124 28.7
X\7 453 367 81.0 X41 443 278 62.8
x n 414 300 72.5 X42 436 169 38.8
Xld 427 387 90.6 X43 423 300 70.9
X20 438 356 81.3 X44 436 305 70.0
X21 433 380 87.8 X45 434 177 40.8
X22 420 371 88.3 X46 416 178 42.8
X23 402 335 83.3 X47 438 339 77.4
x 24 412 234 56.8 - - - -
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Figure E.7: 5-Bus With Line Flows MI Localization Results
Table E.7: 5-Bus With Line Flows MI Localization Results
Event Variable Num ber o f Events Localized % Identified
881 881 100
x 2 876 861 98.3
£3 868 833 96.0
X4 822 761 92.6
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X\ 849 691 81.4 X25 833 443 53.2
851 719 84.5 X 26 833 569 68.3
X3 865 701 81.0 X21 872 615 70.5
X i 837 709 84.7 X 2S 795 518 65.2
x 5 887 783 88.3 X 29 846 670 79.2
x & 882 768 87.1 X30 920 674 73.3
x 7 856 713 83.3 X 31 810 690 85.2
X 8 851 708 83.2 X32 828 706 85.2
Xg 842 705 83.7 X33 860 536 62.3
XlO 852 349 41.0 X34 900 670 74.4
Xu 814 450 55.3 X35 828 667 80.6
X12 809 184 22.7 X36 844 354 41.9
X u 805 94 11.7 X37 859 358 41.7
X u 832 663 80.0 X38 856 399 46.6
X u 815 566 69.5 X39 852 328 38.5
X u 838 640 76.4 X40 865 239 27.6
X 17 880 685 77.8 X41 826 541 65.5
X18 894 662 74.1 X42 837 369 44.1
x \9 867 766 88.4 X43 868 613 70.6
X 20 861 685 79.6 X44 832 606 72.8
X21 870 745 85.6 X43 889 380 42.7
X22 883 788 89.2 X46 882 406 46.0
X 23 844 746 88.4 X47 861 663 77.0
X 24 819 459 56.0 - - - -
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Figure E.9: IEEE 14-Bus Without Line Flows SI Localization Results
Table E.9: IEEE 14-Bus Without Line Flows SI Localization Results
Event Variable Num ber of Events Localized % Identified
356 356 100
x4 360 360 100
x 5 319 319 100
x 7 356 356 100
Xg 357 357 100
X \ 0 355 355 100
X \ \ 363 362 100
x\A 399 399 100
o Localization 
-H  Cyber-Event Count
OIO1 •OIO1 1OOI 600006000000000000000000000000600000000000
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F igu re  E.10: IEEE 14-Bus Without Line Flows SII Localization Results
o Localization 
V  Cyber-Event Count
206














Xi 375 315 84.0 X 29 381 187 49.1
X 2 333 256 76.9 X 30 378 41 10.9
X3 335 236 70.5 X 31 394 2 0.51
X 4 339 276 81.4 X 32 353 296 83.9
x 5 349 304 87.1 X 33 379 364 96.0
x6 378 291 77.0 X 34 315 306 97.1
x 7 328 277 84.5 £ 3 5 377 307 81.5
x 8 331 220 66.5 X36 344 220 64.0
Xg 362 306 84.5 X 37 356 281 79.0
XlO 376 314 83.5 X-38 346 305 88.2
x n 366 301 82.2 X 39 335 298 89.0
X \2 352 278 79.0 X 40 368 307 83.4
X n 375 287 76.5 X 41 355 327 92.1
X u 416 348 83.7 X 42 346 326 94.2
X l 5 335 292 87.2 X 43 354 334 94.4
X l 6 343 259 75.5 X 44 370 334 90.3
X \7 363 296 81.5 X 4 5 352 317 90.1
XiB 352 280 79.6 X 4 6 345 304 88.1
X \g 369 280 75.9 X 47 339 286 84.4
X20 368 289 78.5 X 48 359 340 94.7
X 2 \ 376 292 77.7 X49 329 307 93.3
X 22 347 266 76.7 X50 356 321 90.2
X 23 370 275 74.3 X 51 369 332 90.0
X 24 345 257 74.5 X 52 393 360 91.6
X 25 359 269 74.9 X 53 353 335 94.9
X 2& 363 271 74.7 X 54 367 352 95.9
X21 354 276 78.0 £ 5 5 321 303 94.4
X28 348 92 26.4 X 56 359 333 92.8
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Figure E .l l :  IEEE 14-Bus Without Line Flows MI Localization Results
Table E .l l :  IEEE 14-Bus Without Line Flows MI Localization Results
Event Variable Num ber of Events Localized % Identified
X 2 714 714 100
X 4 768 767 99.9
x5 733 732 99.9
X 7 663 662 99.9
Xg 729 726 99.6
XiO 721 718 99.6
X \ l 773 766 99.1
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*1 675 536 79.4 X 29 693 396 57.1
X 2 699 561 80.3 *30 750 100 13.3
* 3 682 514 75.4 X 31 744 11 1.48
X 4 677 571 84.3 x 32 707 646 91.4
£ 5 714 608 85.2 X 33 769 748 97.3
x 6 733 563 76.8 X 34 663 652 98.3
x 7 742 618 83.3 *35 670 619 92.4
x 8 683 464 67.9 *36 715 520 72.7
Xg 756 648 85.7 X 37 685 569 83.1
XlO 727 606 83.4 *38 735 703 95.7
£ l l 676 537 79.4 *39 708 689 97.3
X 12 680 521 76.6 £ 4 0 722 641 88.8
X 13 722 572 79.2 *41 682 657 96.3
X 14 677 550 81.2 X 42 711 688 96.8
X 15 724 622 85.9 X 43 717 689 96.1
X i 6 711 549 77.2 £ 4 4 780 735 94.2
£17 745 607 81.5 £45 717 673 93.9
*18 689 560 81.3 £46 707 676 95.6
X 19 747 554 74.2 X 47 698 650 93.1
X 20 730 562 77.0 *48 758 732 96.6
X 21 699 533 76.3 £ 4 9 716 710 99.2
X 22 723 546 75.5 *50 727 695 95.6
X23 740 570 77.0 *51 705 664 94.2
X 24 714 533 74.7 *52 740 717 96.9
X 25 727 564 77.6 *53 696 692 99.4
*26 702 538 76.6 *54 730 729 99.9
X27 723 565 78.2 *55 720 707 98.2
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Figure E.13: IEEE 14-Bus With Line Flows SI Localization Results
Table E.13: IEEE 14-Bus With Line Flows SI Localization Results
Event Variable Num ber o f Events Localized % Identified
x2 125 125 100
X i 161 161 100
x 5 145 145 100
x 7 152 152 100
X g 141 141 100
x w 125 125 100
Xn 157 157 100















F igure  E.14: IEEE 14-Bus With Line Flows SII Localization Results
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x x 158 123 77.8 X35 162 136 83.9
125 101 80.8 X36 136 94 69.1
x3 146 108 73.9 X37 142 100 70.4
x4 152 128 84.2 X38 154 79 51.2
x5 155 137 88.3 X39 170 110 64.7
x6 157 123 78.3 X40 136 93 68.3
x 7 163 130 79.7 X4I 151 126 83.4
x8 161 123 76.3 X42 147 124 84.3
Xg 132 112 84.8 X43 158 124 78.4
XlO 157 134 85.3 X44 142 111 78.1
Xxx 145 122 84.1 X45 158 141 89.2
XX2 154 112 72.7 X4& 131 96 73.2
X\3 148 113 76.3 X47 153 136 88.8
XU 142 118 83.0 x48 117 106 90.5
Xis 134 120 89.5 X49 136 104 76.4
Xm 153 115 75.1 X 5Q 152 130 85.5
Xl7 135 106 78.5 X51 158 128 81.0
XlS 141 113 80.1 X52 129 107 82.9
x ig 158 115 72.7 x 53 148 127 85.8
x 20 133 100 75.1 X54 146 123 84.2
X21 116 84 72.4 x 55 158 127 80.3
X22 150 117 78 *£56 135 119 88.1
x 23 125 106 84.8 x 57 148 135 91.2
x24 174 135 77.5 x58 159 142 89.3
x 25 146 111 76.0 x 59 140 125 89.2
x 2& 148 117 79.0 x60 146 106 72.6
x 27 134 110 82.0 Xei 136 118 86.7
x 28 179 54 30.1 X62 133 110 82.7
x29 136 68 50 x63 139 6 4.31
x30 154 14 9.09 Xf>4 152 74 48.6
X31 164 0 0 x65 131 14 10.6
x 32 151 111 73.5 x66 159 29 18.2
x33 153 143 93.4 x67 164 43 26.2
x 34 149 141 94.6 X&8 144 52 36.1
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2-69 164 147 89.6 X103 153 4 2.61
^70 166 117 70.4 25 04 137 26 18.9
xn 156 128 82.0 2? 105 152 57 37.5
X72 145 135 93.1 2̂  106 161 35 21.7
£73 129 123 95.3 2:107 170 48 28.2
X74 145 130 89.6 2-108 130 66 50.7
X75 166 155 93.3 2-109 141 92 65.2
X76 121 114 94.2 2̂ 110 134 67 50
X77 163 147 90.1 27m 153 54 35.2
X78 140 135 96.4 2-112 118 38 32.2
X79 160 143 89.3 2̂ 113 143 43 30.0
X80 150 138 92 2:114 126 39 30.9
X81 132 103 78.0 2:115 169 86 50.8
%82 155 143 92.2 2:116 146 119 81.5
X83 141 137 97.1 2:117 151 89 58.9
X84 158 143 90.5 2:118 139 57 41.0
X$5 124 113 91.1 2:119 167 44 26.3
X86 152 146 96.0 2:120 144 57 39.5
x 8 7 158 155 98.1 2:121 166 28 16.8
x88 145 136 93.7 X\22 139 95 68.3
X89 140 135 96.4 2:123 160 63 39.3
X90 154 147 95.4 2:124 133 74 55.6
X 9 1 161 50 31.0 2:125 156 101 64.7
X 9 2 145 93 64.1 2:126 167 87 52.0
X 9 3 144 47 32.6 2:127 150 77 51.3
X94 156 102 65.3 2:128 135 73 54.0
X95 155 114 73.5 2:129 136 68 50
X96 141 103 73.0 2:130 136 119 87.5
Xg7 158 103 65.1 2:131 143 121 84.6
X98 149 89 59.7 2:132 150 99 66
X99 138 105 76.0 2U33 138 113 81.8
2^00 123 86 69.9 2:134 148 100 67.5
^101 140 95 67.8 2:135 145 95 65.5
2-102 141 98 69.5 2:136 151 97 64.2
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Figure E.15: IEEE 14-Bus With Line Flows MI Localization Results
Table E.16: IEEE 14-Bus With Line Flows MI Localization Results
Event Variable N um ber o f Events Localized % Identified
X2 273 273 100
X 4 298 298 100
x 5 296 296 100
x 7 287 287 100
x9 294 294 100
Xio 264 264 100
Xu 317 316 99.7
x 14 336 333 99.1
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X1 267 218 81.6 X35 301 246 81.7
X2 296 225 76.0 X36 313 223 71.2
x 3 319 228 71.4 x 37 250 194 77.6
X4 308 271 87.9 X38 308 167 54.2
Xb 270 225 83.3 X39 289 177 61.2
X6 284 2 2 0 77.4 X40 275 219 79.6
X7 319 261 81.8 X4 1 310 260 83.8
X 8 278 196 70.5 X42 307 266 8 6 . 6
x 9 306 263 85.9 X43 293 229 78.1
X w 270 231 85.5 X44 291 253 86.9
Xu 275 227 82.5 X45 281 265 94.3
X12 316 237 75 X46 291 2 2 2 76.2
X13 308 243 78.8 X47 301 275 91.3
XU 290 243 83.7 X48 300 271 90.3
Xl5 313 271 86.5 X49 320 268 83.7
Xl6 336 251 74.7 *̂ 50 297 245 82.4
X\7 295 228 77.2 ®51 318 273 85.8
X w 284 224 78.8 X32 310 254 81.9
Xw 320 237 74.0 X33 313 284 90.7
x 20 301 217 72.0 X54 295 245 83.0
x 21 302 236 78.1 X55 279 248 8 8 . 8
x 22 294 2 2 1 75.1 •̂ 56 277 250 90.2
x 23 278 217 78.0 X57 269 248 92.1
X24 297 224 75.4 X58 289 261 90.3
X25 295 223 75.5 X59 280 255 91.0
X26 277 2 1 2 76.5 X60 297 259 87.2
X27 298 240 80.5 x6i 297 268 90.2
X28 288 83 28.8 X62 294 257 87.4
X29 308 185 60.0 X63 254 1 2 4.72
X'AO 331 50 15.1 Xq4 309 178 57.6
X 31 264 2 0.75 x65 316 36 11.3
X32 262 219 83.5 xm 299 52 17.3
X33 294 285 96.9 X&7 324 93 28.7
X34 314 296 94.2 XQ8 258 79 30.6
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x69 300 264 88 £103 258 14 5.42
^70 298 202 67.7 3-104 288 52 18.0
X71 268 218 81.3 3-105 263 77 29.2
x 72 308 295 95.7 3-106 251 69 27.4
x 73 303 275 90.7 3-107 281 100 35.5
X74 287 243 84.6 3-108 281 118 41.9
7̂5 309 285 92.2 x \99 301 217 72.0
^76 271 258 95.2 2-110 279 150 53.7
X77 300 288 96 3-111 297 97 32.6
x 78 292 266 91.0 3-112 305 129 42.2
x 79 315 278 88.2 31113 264 86 32.5
x 80 297 275 92.5 XU4 315 107 33.9
X81 317 282 88.9 31115 280 151 53.9
x 82 267 254 95.1 31116 319 291 91.2
x83 275 259 94.1 31117 314 226 71.9
Xg4 308 286 92.8 31118 298 116 38.9
x85 284 263 92.6 31119 299 92 30.7
x 86 320 292 91.2 31120 301 151 50.1
x87 306 287 93.7 31121 292 82 28.0
x88 290 270 93.1 31122 315 229 72.6
x89 309 289 93.5 31123 311 149 47.9
x90 323 303 93.8 31124 269 164 60.9
X91 290 85 29.3 31125 304 216 71.0
x92 311 189 60.7 31126 308 167 54.2
x93 305 106 34.7 31127 300 173 57.6
x94 294 173 58.8 31128 306 185 60.4
x95 285 215 75.4 31129 281 153 54.4
x96 303 226 74.5 31130 327 304 92.9
x97 289 172 59.5 31131 271 241 88.9
x98 297 183 61.6 31132 280 207 73.9
x99 291 211 72.5 31133 307 285 92.8
2-100 266 204 76.6 31134 265 198 74.7
2̂ 101 278 199 71.5 31135 307 214 69.7
x 102 281 213 75.8 31136 264 186 70.4
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